Structure and stability
The debate in Nepal on the governance system, among the parliamentary, presidential and mixed system, is based without adequatelyconsidering the consequences of all the systems, especially in terms of how political actors react and interact with the institutions. Due to the frequent government changes under the Westminster system during the 1990s and even after 2006, many political parties and leaders, intellectuals, and common people have become attracted to the presidential system. They believe that the fixed tenure of the system will ensure stability. However, such fixed tenure of the presidency has not prevented major crises from arising in most of the presidential systems around the world. If laws and institutions are not compatible with interests of actors, the institutions may fail because people will either ignore or work around or against them.
Recommending a new system for a country based on the failure of one system is not sound, safe and proper way to go about managing the problem. The failure of one structure does not mean that another will succeed. The new system could introduce even greater problems. Without evaluating all the systems and their variants, we cannot be sure whether the reasons that led to instability in the Westminster system will not affect the presidential or semi-presidential system as well. We can ascertain which structure has higher chances of producing more stability and consolidating democracy by analysing countries with different systems. Basing our analysis solely on the Nepali case may lead us into a trap of drawing a faulty conclusion. For example, many often consider Nepal as small but it is around the 40th most populated among around 200 states in the world. This example demonstrates that what apparently is thought to be true when one looks at only one or a few cases, in fact, turns out to be untrue when looked at from a comprehensive perspective.
Doyens of comparative politics like Juan Linz and Fred Riggs found that the presidential system witnessed more failure than the parliamentary system in the world. Except for the US presidential system, all other presidential systems have witnessed major crises, at least once, that threatened or destabilised the democratic regimes. All the Latin American presidencies faced major constitutional crises. Francis Fukuyama and his colleagues found that the new Asian presidencies of the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan have faced major crises too. Similar is the story of the African presidencies. Based on the experience of presidential countries around the world and Nepali political actors’ culture and behaviour, the likelihood of the presidential system producing political stability is low.
Many parliamentary systems have failed around the world, as it did in Nepal, but many parliamentary systems have succeeded as well. Thus, compared to the presidential system, the parliamentary system has better chances of consolidating democracy, among other things, by reducing governmental instability. The challenge for Nepal is to see what went wrong during the 1990s and thereafter and see how other successful parliamentary democracies addressed the problems of instability.
All political parties desire to control executive power, more so in Nepal, because the distribution of resources and state power affects future electoral success. Thus, if a political party wins the presidential system and begins to govern the country, the remaining political parties will become restlessafter a couple of years. The culture of abusing state power and resources to expand the ruling party’s organisation and interests will further heighten the frustration and desperation of opposition parties. Since the opposition cannot get rid of the president so easily through formal systemic channels, they are likely to engage in either the cumbersome and lengthy impeachment process (if such a provision is inserted in the Constitution) or rely on non-systemic ways, such as inciting the army to intervene, or more likely, hitting the streets to get rid of the president.
In a country where bandas are called for even seemingly unimportant reasons, one could witness frequent and sustained street protests against the president after a couple years. Such disruptive street demonstrations against presidents were a major factor that invited crises to presidential regimes in countries around the world. The probability that the president him/ herself will resort to an extra-constitutional mechanism to repress such street protests that s/he views as obstructing the mandate given by the people to govern. Whether the sustained street protests succeed or not, they will inflict much wider disruptions to the polity, society and economy. The government changes may be less than in the parliamentary system, but the instability will be of larger scale and more costly to the country. At an extreme, the process could threaten or even lead to the breakdown of the democratic regime.
The Maoists are the biggest proponents of the presidential system, but it may not benefit them either. As a party is that is perceived to be the most threatening, the CPN-UML, Nepali Congress and some other political parties might unite against the Maoists to defeat it in the presidential election. In such a case, the Maoist support base of around 30 percent, even if it remains or increases slightly, will not be able to deliver the presidency to the party. Second, even if the Maoists win the presidential election, they may not be able to govern without major disruptive protests, as mentioned above. Third, the judicial review mechanism may work against any actor or party that attempts to concentrate power in the office of the presidency. The presidential system is, in principle, a mechanism to divide power and ensure checks and balances among the branches of government. If the presidency attempts to concentrate power, the Court could rule against it, citing the principle of division of power of the presidential system. There are plenty of precedents around the world to help make such an interpretation.
If the Maoists want a strong executive they should opt for a parliamentary system where the ruling parties can more easily formulate policies they prefer because the executive and legislature are fused. The bills presented by the government often get passed because the ruling party has a majority in the Parliament. On the other hand, in a presidential system, legislations are initiated by the legislature, which could be controlled by the opposition parties.
It is surprising that political parties like the CPN-UML are rooting for an elected prime minister as the head of the executive, which is a presidential system in a different name. When the head of the executive is elected, the contest is over one position and primarily between the two largest parties. Such a process will benefit the two largest parties and work against other smaller parties, including the CPN-UML. Once voters begin to vote for one of the two largest parties in the direct election of the executive, some may continue to vote for the same parties in the future parliamentary and local elections.
The second part of this article will appear in nexy Friday’s paper
Posted on: 2012-01-20 08:17
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