A question of form
Critics of the Maoists have deployed two tools to create opinion against the former rebels—the first is by under-estimating their power, ridiculing their tactics, and predicting their imminent doom. The second is by exaggerating the scale of their strength, attributing the worst of intentions to them, and prophesising that the Maoists would ‘capture the state’. Both these are propaganda tactics, and reality on the ground has taken a trajectory very different from these projections.
The Maoists are the strongest of the parties in Nepal, but not strong enough to trample on dissent and competitors. In fact, they have to deal with contending interests and demands in a fragmented polity. In the process, they have lost the edge of being a coherent and consolidated unit. They are divided, and their cadre is demoralised.
The Maoists have been smart in recognising their allies and enemies at a particular moment. But like normal political actors, their decisions are in response to day to day developments, and they make mistakes often. For instance, Prachanda’s tenure in government is a classic lesson in how not to do politics. He opened up too many fronts, and was left fighting battles which undermined his power and credibility.
The mixed record has meant that the Maoists have neither been destroyed, nor have they been able to dominate all spheres of society.
The point of this analytical detour is to show that Nepal should not decide or reject a model of governance based on manufactured fears about the Maoists. Yes, Prachanda’s aim is very clear—to be the first elected executive president of the country. Given that despite weaknesses, he has shown remarkable skills in transforming the Maoist party, he will probably win in a direct stand-off. But the grounds for arguing against a particular model cannot merely be based on the following line: ‘Prachanda wants it, he may maximise his power and become a dictator, and thus we should reject it’.
That is a defeatist argument, born more out of paranoia and prejudice than facts, and is based on really short term calculations. It underestimates the strength of non-Maoist political sentiment and segment; does not take into account the plurality of interests and social groups across the country; ignores the emergence of strong regional parties; neglects the power of the media and civil society; discounts the role of constitutional institutions; and forgets that Nepal’s younger population and marginalised communities will not take dictation from one ruler in Kathmandu anymore. Irrespective of the model of government, a fragmented and chaotic democratic system is a far more likely scenario than a clean authoritarian regime led by Prachanda.
There is however a good argument to be made against the mixed model of government currently on the table. And that is it will lead to perennial conflict between the president and the PM, which in turn will paralyse policy
making.
Nepal does not have a happy experience with dual centres of power. The king and the elected governments had differences over nominations to the upper house, appointment of ambassadors, and most crucially, the deployment of the Army. A ceremonial president and an elected PM got into a major constitutional battle two years ago. Intra and inter-party personality clashes have long histories. And no two leaders—who have similar years of experience and broadly belong to the same age group—really accept the authority of the other.
But the issue goes beyond personalities. The really arbitrary division of powers between the president and PM will paralyse decision making. The president is the supreme commander of the army, responsible for certain appointments including ambassadors, and has the power to ask the PM to prove his majority in the house. The PM, broadly speaking, is in charge of day to day governance and administration.
This throws up a range of issues. Who will take the final call on matters of strategic importance? Who does the foreign minister report to—the PM, who would have appointed him, or the president, who has appointed Nepal’s envoys and will be a key interlocutor for foreign dignitaries? What if the president and the PM have radically different foreign policy orientations? What is the interplay between the Nepal Army, the defence ministry, the PMO and the president? Will the provincial chief ministers deal with the PM or president if there is a key political issue to be resolved? What if the two are on opposite sides on a policy matter, in a context when the president has the mandate of the people and the PM retains the confidence of the parliament?
Look at the alternatives.
There are two major advantages of the parliamentary system. The first is it forces the executive to be accountable on a day to day basis. And the second is, in a multi-national society, it offers avenues of representation to diverse groups and gives them a better chance of getting a share of the power structure. The major disadvantage—as Maoists often point out—is that it leads to instability, as witnessed in the 1990s, and all political energy is expended in survival and horse-trading. With a mixed electoral system, it is inevitable that there will be a hung parliament again, leading to similar games.
The advantage of the presidential system is it will help the executive regain authority in the country, and will lead to coherent policy-making. In a context when no government since 1951 has completed its full term, and the average tenure post 1990 has been nine months, there is a yearning for stability which this system provides. But this is precisely the disadvantage as it could lead to authoritarian tendencies, aka Rajpakse and Putin.
The middle way is not mixing the two models, but addressing the weaknesses of the model to be adopted. So, one way perhaps could be to adopt a parliamentary system, but with provisions for stability. For instance, a government which has the confidence of the house will have a minimum tenure of two years; additionally, a vote of no confidence will have to be accompanied with an alternative. The other option is to have a presidency, but with stronger provisions for accountability. This will mean legislative veto on major policy decisions, especially regarding foreign relations, defence affairs and budget.
Developed democracies continue to struggle with this question. In India, there is a fresh debate about the merits of the presidential system in the backdrop of disruptions in parliament. In US, analyst Fareed Zakaria has speculated that the political gridlock—in the backdrop of the deficit and taxation crisis—could be attributed perhaps to the presidential system.
The Maoist disdain for parliament and NC’s fears of a presidency will probably leave us with a ‘French system’. But let us acknowledge it is a bad compromise, which will throw up more complications than answers.
Posted on: 2012-01-04 09:56
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