Back to the future
- Ringside View
There were several good things about the 90s. The democratic movement and 1990 constitution ushered in an open society and made the dark days of the Panchayat a thing of the past. A recent essay by Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze shows that Nepal made remarkable strides in terms of social indicators in the past few decades, outpacing India on some counts. In his book Defending Democracy, former finance minister Ram Sharan Mahat used similar parameters to highlight the achievements of that period. But certain features between 1990 and 2002 shrunk the support base for the earlier constitution and eroded the credibility of the dominant actors of those years. That benefited the far-right and far-left of the political spectrum and Nepal is still in the process of restoring the lost democratic equilibrium.
Similar trends are visible now. And while the 2006 political framework is not really in danger—in fact, the chances of its success have shot up with the seven-point deal—politicians would do well to be more cautious in their reckless pursuit and exercise of power.
The first pattern that put off people in the 90s was the political instability. Since 1994, with internal NC tensions and Girija babu’s decision to announce elections, the euphoria began dissipating. Nepal then tried each permutation and combination of ruling alliances; on an average they lasted less than a year and each change in government was accompanied with a strong element of horse-trading. Koirala’s formula of governance, as TV presenter Vijay Kumar puts it, rested on accumulating paisa (money), controlling the police and prashasan (administration), and keeping Delhi on the right side. His successors emulated the model. Citizens were taken for granted, the cumulative impact of which was felt by the democratic parties when their base began shifting.
The second problem was the use of state power for purely personal ends. In any polity, there is corruption and nepotism—this is even more salient in societies where helping one’s family is seen as a part of one’s Dharma and the line between the private and public is blurred. But people turn a blind eye if this is done in moderation and accompanied with initiatives that are in larger public interest. In our case, dozens of senior and mid-level leaders became ministers in the ever-changing political milieu of Kathmandu; many activists cornered benefits at the district and village level. Those citizens with access to power were able to extract some benefits, be it appointments, promotions, transfers, licenses and contracts. But it did not translate widely into public goods, thus breeding disillusionment and alienation.
And the third, perhaps, most critical issue was the steady degeneration of public institutions, which became private fiefdoms of the minister or bureaucrat in charge. Name any institution, be it a public sector unit or a state organ meant for service delivery and its decline can be traced to this period—then Royal Nepal Airlines, Sajha transport, Nepal Police, Janakpur Cigarette Factory, Nepal Oil Corporation, Nepal Electricity Authority and so forth. Leaders appointed cronies, who in turn bled the institutions dry and shared profits with their political patron. The politicians kept a share of the resources thus milked, while distributing some to their loyalists to maintain their party base.
The best thing of the 2006 change was that it gradually shifted power away to a new and previously marginalised social base and expanded democratic space irreversibly. The most unfortunate aspect, however, has been the absence of any effort to change this political culture we inherited from the past. No one expected that the country would become a paradise of liberal or radical democracy, that institutions would suddenly reform, that corruption would fade away, or that the incentives of political actors would transform overnight. But there was hope that the old way of doing things would not get entrenched further—that has now, more or less, been dashed. In fact, the same three features outlined above are even more starkly visible now.
Six individuals—Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, GPK, Manmohan Adhikari, Sher Bahadur Deuba, Lokendra Bahadur Chand, Surya Bahadur Thapa—took turns to run the various governments from 90-2005. In the last five years itself, five individuals—GPK, Prachanda, Madhav Nepal, Jhalanath Khanal and now Baburam Bhattarai—have led different governments, giving the principle of circulation of elites an entirely new meaning.
To ensure one’s support base within the party, appease allies, and remain in power, PM’s have expanded the size of the council of ministers—with Bhattarai taking it to indefensible levels. This becomes even more blatant when everyone knows that expansion is not based on the rationale of efficiency or governance, but on the understanding that the minister has a blank cheque to use the position to expand his wealth and political power further.
And if that is the minister’s motivation, is there any surprise that our institutions continue to rot? Gokarna Bista’s token efforts to bring some change in NEA by recruiting a senior executive through open competition has already suffered a setback, with the person concerned resigning due to political interference. Former Planning Commission VC, Pitamber Sharma, quit within a few months of his appointment during Prachanda’s tenure. Sharma was a close comrade of PM Bhattarai previous to his underground years and is one of the country’s most respected thinkers. He often recounts his disappointment about the fact that the Maoists—despite the rhetoric—were unwilling or unable to take even small reformist measures that would have gradually improved state functioning, let alone think of a fresh development strategy. This can perhaps be traced back to what an international organisation suggested in a report last year—the political system and culture transformed the Maoists more than the Maoists could transform the political system.
Politicians can afford to be smug right now since there is no alternative organised force that can channel the discontent, but this can well change. Devising a more responsive and credible political culture becomes even more urgent since all the structural ills that plague Nepali society—unemployment, inequity and inequality, discrimination, lack of justice—persist. Yes, the priority right now is completing the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants and finishing the statute. But unless a beginning is made in reforming the existing mode and methods of governance, Nepal may well get a constitution, but it will not be at peace.
Posted on: 2011-11-16 09:10
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