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Unmin extension
SEP 08 -
The present report of the Secretary-General presents a discouraging picture of the state of Nepal’s peace process, and of the failure of the political parties to invest in its revival.
The disagreement between the government and the opposition over the continued role of UNMIN in the peace process is also reported.
As the Three-Point Agreement of late May makes explicit, the issues of power-sharing, completion of the new constitution, and solutions for the former Maoist army personnel are now interlinked. The current void in the peace process illustrates a long-standing reluctance to invest in the kind of sustained and structured negotiations that might drive progress; the proper architecture for this was never put in place, and the once-promising High-Level Political Mechanism was abandoned not long after the death of G.P. Koirala in March. It is not too late to establish a clear and dependable discussion mechanism, with which the parties can also firmly put to rest any fears that they will abandon the path of the constitution, and democracy, and demonstrate a new seriousness towards resolving outstanding issues.
The commitments that were made in the CPA, the Interim Constitution and other auxiliary agreements formed the negotiated basis for ending Nepal’s 10-year war, and for responding to Nepal’s historically-marginalised groups, including Madheshi, indigenous and Dalit populations. These commitments include the integration into the security forces, or the social rehabilitation, of the Maoist army personnel, who were to be supervised by a Special Committee, and the democratisation of the Nepal Army, defined as the determination of its appropriate size, development of its democratic structure and national and inclusive character, and training imparted in accordance with the norms and values of democracy and human rights.
Pending the implementation of these forward-looking commitments, the Nepal Army and the Maoist army were made
subject to restrictions in order (quoting Article 4 of the CPA), “to hold the election to [the] constituent assembly in [a] free and fair manner and for the democratic restructuring of the army to proceed.”
The parties negotiated the specifics of these mutual restrictions, under which the Maoist army is cantoned in 28 sites across Nepal and the Nepal Army is confined to barracks other than for a number of routine functions.
In recent months the caretaker government, sections of the Nepali Congress and the UML, and the Nepal Army, argue that the Nepal Army should no longer be monitored by UNMIN, citing a provision of the CPA according to which “the concept of two sides shall cease to exist”, upon the establishment of the Interim Legislature-Parliament, a development that took place in January 2007.
Whether or not “two sides” still exist, there are manifestly still two armies. The restrictions on the armies were to be transitional and the Secretary-General has repeatedly argued against the prolonged confinement of the two armies without a long-term solution, calling for early decisions to be addressed in the context of the longer-term reform of the security sector. The changes foreseen to the armies under the CPA have not taken place. It is cause for concern that the Nepal Army now seeks unilaterally to withdraw from and to alter the scope of the Agreement on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA). The arms monitoring agreement contains provisions whereby the parties can review or modify it. The government and the Army have not sought to use this modality. Any unilateral decision in this regard may have the effect of abrogating the treaty. These developments have direct and immediate bearing on the work of UNMIN. UNMIN’s monitoring of arms and armies, and chairmanship of the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee, are set out in the arms monitoring agreement itself. UNMIN monitors strictly at the invitation of the parties, and with their agreement. Absent a fresh agreement between the parties, UNMIN cannot continue to monitor one side at the request of the other; neither does it have the authority to introduce fundamental changes to the monitoring regime.
The government’s pressure for an end to the international monitoring of the Nepal Army has been accompanied by a flood of criticism directed at UNMIN. A Nepal Army internal document, entitled The Basis for UNMIN’s Exit, which has been leaked to the press, asserts that UNMIN is siding with the Maoists, is not impartial, and is obstructing the government and the Nepal Army in fulfilling their national duty. The Chief of Army Staff has been visible and vocal in lobbying the political leadership and diplomatic representatives for UNMIN’s departure. This activism by the Army on issues within the political sphere seems however to have been encouraged by some senior political leaders, with the Defence Minister publicly accusing UNMIN of being the mouthpiece of the Maoists. UNMIN has protested the Army’s impugning of the integrity of the United Nations. The caretaker government has yet to repudiate the actions or remarks of its Army and its ministers.
As has been reported to the Council in the past, the Nepal Army has since 2007 continued to recruit personnel in defiance of the arms monitoring agreement and bypassing the JMCC. Reports of recruitment by the Nepal Army and by
the Maoist army have been brought to the JMCC for discussion and review, as is appropriate. The Nepal Army has now refused to accept any future discussion of its recruitment in the JMCC, and has
said it will not take part in JMCC meetings if this issue is on the agenda. Seeking to restrict discussion in the designated forum, the JMCC, undermines the agreed arms monitoring regime.
The recent direct challenge to the arms monitoring agreement takes the peace process in a sharply wrong direction. Risks to the peace process, and to democratic governance in Nepal, are real. The risks include an unresolved leadership battle which may keep critical decisions in limbo and, at this point, appears unlikely to deliver the consensus government that would form a stronger basis for concluding the peace process.
They include the risk that the CA, even after a 12-month extension, will expire without a new constitution having been drafted. They also include a climate in the country of deteriorating security: in late July, the Government decided to give special protection to Village Development Committee (VDC) secretaries across the country, after more than 1,200 secretaries in 31 districts tendered a collective resignation, citing insecurity. The risks include threats to journalistic independence, with killings of media personnel earlier in the year followed by death threats to senior editors and other acute constraints on their operations and reporting. They include a contested end to the monitoring of arms and armies, with unpredictable consequences.
The biggest risk of all may be that the peace process and parliamentary processes appear discredited, sending a discouraging signal to existing and emerging groups about taking the democratic route to push for change.
UNMIN’s tasks can only succeed if there is overall political progress in Nepal. Its role is supportive. Ascribing to the UN the blame for the parties’ failure to move forward politically is not a new phenomenon, but it has grown incrementally and in intensity. The hard political decisions needed to take Nepal’s peace process forward are beyond UNMIN’s mandate and capacity, and lie firmly in the hands of Nepal’s political leaders.
Some things need to change if the peace process is to be brought to a successful end. With respect to UNMIN, it is proposed that in the first instance the mandate be discussed with a new duly-formed government, in the context of the parties’ fulfillment of their commitments and the phasing out of the Mission. The Secretary-General would then report back to the Council and in the event of there being neither clarity nor consensus in this regard, would propose alternative measures, including the possible termination of the mandate. I would like once again to make clear that the desire of the
Secretary-General is to see the mission complete its tasks and withdraw, in a manner that does not jeopardise the peace process and maintains continued international support for peace consolidation. The United Nations has no interest or desire to prolong the life of the Mission by a day more than necessary.
Nepal’s peace process has not failed, even though it has moved far more slowly and unevenly than anticipated by either the parties or the Council. The original ambitious timelines have not been maintained on any count and this is likely to be a protracted endeavour.
For well over a year now the process has essentially stalled and the level of mistrust has risen. The process can be brought back on track if the political leadership is ready to reassess priorities and place this process at the front and centre of their political activity, recognising that only through continued and persistent negotiation can it move forward. At a time when political moderation is in short supply, the parties have a great deal of work to do in order to make the case that they intend Nepal’s peace to be permanent and irreversible.
(Excerpts from Sept. 7 briefing by Karin Landgren, Representative of the Secretary-General in Nepal, to the Security Council on the request of Nepal for UN assistance in support of the peace process)
Posted on: 2010-09-09 08:44
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