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UNMIN’s mandate
AUG 25 -
The current mandate of UNMIN is expiring in mid-September 2010. Lack of progress in the peace process is a matter of concern to all, and UNMIN has expressed it in no uncertain term. It has sought the position of the government and political parties about the planned timetable for integration and rehabilitation (I/R) of Maoist combatants, and UNMIN’s future. The government in consultation with major political parties will have to take a decision regarding its future—whether to continue its presence in the present form, or with revised mandate, or terminate its presence and handover the responsibilities to other appropriate body.
Superseded
UNMIN was established in early 2007 immediately after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) at the request of the host country following political consensus. Its mandated task was to help the implementation of the Agreement on the Management of Arms and Armed Personnel (AMAA), particularly, ‘“to monitor the confinements of Maoist army combatants and their weapons within designated cantonment areas and monitor the Nepal Army to ensure that it remains within the barracks and its weapons are not used against any side.”
Much water has flown down the Bagmati river since UNMIN’s original mandate was written in late 2006. Interim government was formed with Maoist participation, following the promulgation of the Interim Constitution 2007. Election was held to the Constituent Assembly (CA) in which the CPN (Maoist) emerged as the largest political party in the legislature, and led the first Cabinet. The country became a republic. Consequent upon these developments and experience of the last four years of peace process, the original mandate of UNMIN has largely been superseded and outdated, and therefore, calls for review.
The reference of Nepal Army (NA) remaining in the barracks, like the Maoist combatants in the cantonments, as mentioned in the original mandate, was to ensure that it would not be used to unduly influence the CA election. Another objective was to prevent
the NA from being a possible obstacle to the country’s march towards a
republic state in view of its traditional loyalty to the institution of monarchy. Both these objectives have been achieved, and NA has fully accepted the realities of changed political context and complied with new directives. Furthermore, it has an important duty of performing the role mandated by the constitution and relevant laws. Article 4.8 of the CPA clarifies that the Nepal Army will continue to perform its normal functions like border security, security of the conservation areas, protected parks, banks, airports, power houses, telephone towers, central secretariat and security of VIPs.
Against this background, continuation of UNMIN surveillance and monitoring of NA, almost at par with the former rebel force waiting to be reintegrated and rehabilitated, is unfair and unjustified, particularly when the NA is under civilian control and accountable to parliament. This must stop.
Obsolete paradigm
It is ironical that UNMIN continues to object to Nepal Army’s recruitment of army personnel even to fill up the vacant posts citing Article 5.1.2 of the CPA, which says, “Both sides shall not recruit additional military forces or shall not transport arms and ammunitions and explosives or conduct military activities against each other”. This is contrary to the ruling of Nepal’s Supreme Court, which says that fresh intake within the size existing at the time of CPA signing cannot be interpreted as additional recruitment. If the NA had stopped such routine recruitments since Nov. 6, 2006 when the CPA was signed, the size of Nepal Army would have been severely depleted and truncated by now, making its normal functions difficult.
There is also no justification in continuing the reference of “two sides” or “parties to conflict” to indicate Nepal government and the CPN (Maoist), or the Nepal Army and the Maoist combatants. This paradigm is obsolete and outdated.
Article 10.5 of the CPA has clearly said that the concept of two sides would cease to exist after the formation of the Interim parliament.
Controversial Role
It is generally perceived that UNMIN officials have a pro Maoist bias—which is often reflected in their reports and actions—raising question about the impartiality of the world body. I have myself publicly commented on some of them presented to the Security Council, questioning their tenor, nuance and even contents. In fact Prachanda boasted to his cadres during a training session in Shaktikhor that the UNMIN Chief is secretly supporting them. UNMIN has also been criticised for the huge gap between public expectation and their ability to deliver with respect to monitoring and supervising the combatants. The mandated task “the confinement of CPN-M combatants and their weapons to designated cantonment areas” has not been handled effectively.
There is no daily roll call of the combatants under UNMIN supervision. They rely on second hand reports by Maoist commanders, without verification. About half of the registered combatants reportedly do not stay in the camps, but collect the monthly allowance provided by the government. Many of them have deserted the camps long ago and joined other outfits or rebel groups about which UNMIN has very little information. UNMIN has displayed helplessness in the face of blatant criminal activities involving the inmates, and the camps being used for political training and indoctrination by the CPN (Maoist). Activities of the likes of Kali Bahadur Kham Magar, and incidents like those of Kapilabastu and Nepalganj speak for themselves. The government also had genuine grievance when UNMIN refused to share information with them about the inmates for the purpose of monthly payments.
The constitutional provision says that the temporary cantonments of the Maoist combatants would come under the control and command of the Special Committee comprising of the representatives of major political parties. Subsequently, the seven-party agreement of June 25, 2008 stated that the Special Committee would complete the rehabilitation and integration within six months after which the government would have no obligation whatsoever. The integration and rehabilitation (I/R) was expected to be completed within six month after the CA election, while the constitution making would take two years. But the Maoists refuse to implement these constitutional obligation and written agreement. They insist that the I/R will have to wait until the constitution is drafted. They are trying to use their military force, instead of the parliamentary strength, as a leverage to write the constitution of their liking. Similarly, they want to link the question of Special Committee’s control over cantonments to their coming to power. Such postures represent serious deviations from the peace process.
Conclusion
The current impasse has arisen because of the Maoist refusal to renounce violence and demobilise the former combatants. UNMIN’s interpretation about its role vis-à-vis the Nepal Army is also outdated and invalid. Continuation of their presence in the present form will not be without further criticism and controversies. In the interest of UN’s reputation and effectiveness, the present mandate must be revisited to reflect the new developments of the post-CA election period. Its future role should be limited to: first hand monitoring of Maoist camps, not relying on second-hand reports; and supporting the Special Committee in the I/R of the Maoist combatants and disposition of arms. Nepal Army must be kept out of UNMIN’s purview, and should be allowed to function as a normal army, subject to the country’s own laws and regulations.
(The author is former finance minister and member of the Special Committee on Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of PLA combatants)
Posted on: 2010-08-26 08:49
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