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The Saran doctrine
AUG 18 -
India’s Special Envoy Shyam Saran returned to New Delhi on Aug. 6 after completing his three-day special mission aimed at helping to form a “consensus government” in Nepal amid the political crisis. During his Kathmandu sojourn, he held hectic consultations with the top leaders of the major parties, President Ram Baran Yadav, Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal and Army Chief Chhatraman Singh Gurung and took stock of Nepal’s situation and also conveyed India’s opinions.
The leaders who attended the meetings have not disclosed what they discussed, and Saran has also kept mum about his meetings with the leaders. But the uproar caused by his visit has been haunting Nepali politics. Explaining the purpose of his visit when he landed
at the airport on Aug. 4, he said, “My role will be to facilitate a few political consultations among the major parties for national consensus.”
Whether the visit was successful in facilitating political consultations or meeting the expectations of the Indian prime minister is not known because the chemistry of the coalition remains unchanged. And there doesn’t seem to be any immediate possibility of shifting of alliances. The recent developments in Nepali politics have not given any hint of any ‘facilitation’. Upon returning to Delhi, Saran rushed to the VIP terminal without speaking to journalists, which might be an indication that the visit had not been up to the mark. Otherwise, he would have spoken comfortably to the media.
Despite some ambiguities in finding a solution to Nepal’s current crisis, Saran has explicitly put forth two doctrines. The common point in the two doctrines is that the would-be prime minister of Nepal should be loyal to India and protect its strategic and security
interests. This is the strategic stand of India too. In the real sense, this can be called diplomacy that always puts the “national interest” first. Nepali leaders have never given the protection of national sovereignty and unity a serious thought; instead, they think more about their personal and party interests.
The nitty-gritty of the two doctrines are as follows: Doctrine 1. The Nepali Congress, the CPN (UML), the Madhesi Morcha (MJF-L, MJF-N, TMLP and NSP), the RPP and the RJP should form an alliance, which he named ‘’Democratic Alliance’’. Saran mentioned the names of these parties, but he implied all the parties which believe in democracy and the multiparty system. The main architect of this school of thought in Nepal is former prime minister Surya Bahadur Thapa who is considered close to the Gandhi family. The late G.P. Koirala was also for this broader alliance, but he abandoned this concept when bringing the 10-year-long “People’s War” to a close with the landmark Delhi agreement. Koirala followed a policy of reconciliation.
It is notable that Saran had met Thapa first. The Indian emissary has not said that the existing alliance (NC, UML, MJP-L, RPP) should be continued, but insisted on a “broader alliance” of all democratic forces which could keep the Maoists on track, meaning under pressure. In other words India wants to divide Nepali politics by creating two poles—a democratic and a leftist alliance led respectively by the Nepali Congress and the UCPN (Maoist). He understands that the UML can be adjusted in both these camps. As the largest democracy in the world, it is justified that India wishes to see democracy in its periphery. But the incumbent and transitional Nepal cannot be divided into two political poles. Though Saran has not spoken about the left movement in Nepal, he surely knows that the Nepali left has 62 percent of the vote in parliament. If the left forms an alliance and moves forward with a progressive agenda, it may reject Indian interests. This is the worrisome situation for New Delhi.
India has branded Naxalites a “terrorist force” and believes that Nepali Maoists have brotherhood relations with Indian Maoists. Nepali Maoist leaders too have been supporting this Indian notion by saying that they have ideological relations with Indian Maoists. This is a point of threat to India. Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh wants Nepali Maoists to be totally detached from Indian Maoists.
Similarly, the statements and activities of Nepali Maoist leaders seem to speak of rebellion. Prachanda and Mohan Baidya still believe in Lenin’s strategy of power capture as they have become the largest party in the CA through the people’s vote. Therefore, like Nepal’s major parties, India too desires to contain the UCPN (Maoist). It is said that the current conflict between Baburam Bhattarai and Prachanda is the result of a “design” hatched by the Indian establishment and Nepal’s “so-called” democratic parties to bring the Maoists down to size.
If these two camps are formed, there will be conflict. A permanent bipolar conflict might benefit India by serving its strategic interests. Saran has also assured the Maoists that if they implement the policy and proposal of the peace process, they can be considered for leadership of the government. This is a reluctant option for India. It remains to be seen if the Maoists are ready to take this path.
Doctrine 2. Saran is most knowledgeable about Nepali geopolitics. The former Indian ambassador to Nepal knows the importance of the Tarai region in India’s national security. Recognising the need to safeguard India’s strategic interest (China and the ISI factor), he knows that the lowlands bordering India’s Bihar and UP states should be protected. For that, the Madhesi parties, which are split into four fringe parties, should be united. He knows that Madhesi unification may take a couple of years. Therefore, he suggested that they cobble together a working alliance. The first task of such a coalition would be to take a unified decision regarding government formation.
We should not forget that Saran was one of the “external architects” of Madhesi politics for which the parties were established. It does not mean that the Madhesi leaders had not played any role; they had. According to Saran, Madhesi parties can practically be loyal to India. It is the reality too. Therefore, to create pressure against Kathmandu, Madhesi unity is the best option for India. This can be taken as a strategic Indian move.
Saran arrived in Kathmandu at a time when the 11 members of the Upendra-led MJF had defied the party decision and voted for Prachanda, much to Delhi’s dislike. Similarly, his visit took place when one of the ex-royal family members had been engaged in buying off some CA members of the Tarai parties. Both these moves were against Indian interests. Reinstatement of the monarchy in any form or a weakened Madhes can lead to a backlash for the South Block.
India is facing five major problems—Naxalism, autonomy in Indian-administered Kashmir, double-digit inflation, religious extremism and terrorism. They are all, in one way or the other, linked to the Nepal situation. Again, China is a rising superpower. In such a situation, India cannot lose its security umbrella in Nepal.
Saran’s visit should be evaluated from India’s interest as well as Nepal’s. However, Nepali leaders should not lean towards any one neighbour but maintain equal distance and equal proximity.
(The author is chief reporter of Kantipur daily)
gopal@kantipur.com.np
Posted on: 2010-08-19 08:39
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