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A lesson for our Maoists
JUN 27 -
Factionalism within communist parties is no novelty in the history of communism. Mao had to deal with factions between ideologues who romanticised continuing the revolution as the only way to move forward and pragmatist communists who propagated the importance of bureaucracy, economics and security towards the formation of a stable state. These two factions never saw eye to eye and helped Mao to stay in power. The organisational structure of the communist party placed him at the top of the food chain, and his authority was based on personal loyalties owed to him by the faction leaders. This allowed him to be the sole figure that enjoyed the power to act as a bridge between the factions.
When pragmatist communists such as Deng Xiaoping began to strengthen the bureaucracy and economics after 1949, Mao and the conservative factions saw such a move as being a direct attack on Mao’s power hold. Henceforth, he began to side with the hardcore ideologues who literally worshipped Mao. Mao would then purge visionaries such as Deng Xiaoping and romanticise communist ideology to such a heightened level that he could not see millions dying of hunger in the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) or students beating their own teachers in the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).
The factionalism that the Chinese witnessed in the Communist Party may provide some lessons to Prachanda, who seems to be benefiting from the emerging factionalism in the Maoist party. Between 1952-56, Mao cultivated the power of Liu Shaoqi to make him his heir; then as Liu became powerful, Mao felt threatened by Liu’s prominence, so he brought Gao Gang to challenge Liu. And then again Mao sided with Liu and sacrificed Gao. Mao had the political acumen to play one faction against another to consolidate his personal power, something we can see in Prachanda’s leadership.
At a later phase, as Mao realised that his power was diminishing within the party, he waged the Cultural Revolution in order to ideologically enlighten the youth so that they may revolt against the “capitalist roaders”. Capitalist roaders was a term coined for the Chinese Communist Party members who had lapsed from communist ideology to significantly embrace state controlled capitalism and the luxury that followed. However, the main target of the Cultural Revolution were pragmatic communists who, after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, saw communist philosophy as being very romantic but extremely impractical to govern a billion people.
Even if the contextual political circumstances are different from those of Mao, Prachanda has learnt the importance of factionalism for his political sustainability. Henceforth, he cosies up to the ideologue faction of Mohan Vaidya when he needs them to enforce his own position within the Maoists to counter the pragmatic Baburam faction. However, often in cases when Vaidya’s faction seems to be garnering more power, he happily holds Baburam’s hand just to make sure that Vaidya’s faction never becomes strong enough to jeopardise his own power ambitions.
Reconciliation between these two factions is an extremely difficult task, and Prachanda is in no mood to carry out that task because such a bridge would reduce his significance within his own party. Rather, he has made a conscious decision to label Baburam India’s sympathiser, the way Mao labelled his enemies “capitalist roaders”, in order to weaken Baburam’s growing influence within the party and his bid to be the next prime minister, thus energising the Vaidya faction. His justification that the party may split if Baburam were to become prime minister may hold some water, but it is one of many arguments.
The weakening of the Nepali Congress after the two political architects of the Nepali Congress, namely Girija and Sher Bahadur, split the party based on their conflicting views on the emergency stature in 2002 happened after Sher Bahadur became prime minister. This is the primary reason why the Congress does not want Sher Bahadur back in power today. The Congress became relatively weak after that as factionalism began to grow among the party members. In this sense, the Maoists may be correct to not let Baburam become the next prime minister. In case Baburam fails to lead the party as well as the country simultaneously, he will further alienate many Maoist cadres for whom the sticking glue of the party has primarily been its ideology—Vaidya’s faction.
This faction will be significantly weakened if Baburam’s leadership is inclined towards pragmatism rather than ideology. It would be asking Vaidya to close the little red book by Mao and read From Third to First: The Singapore Story by Lee Kuan Yew. Even though the ideologues in the Maoist party will be weakened if Baburam becomes the next PM, complete division of the party is farfetched. Prachanda, who relies on this base, will see himself weaker as Baburam consolidates power as prime minister. Moreover, if Baburam succeeds in his new role as PM, the aspirations of Prachanda and Vaidya may well rest in history. Such a possibility, which may be the demise of Prachanda’s political career, has made him reinforce factionalism within the Maoist party rather than alleviate the tension.
Nonetheless, if Baburam is chosen to become the next prime minister, he may also energise the moderate faction within his party, the independent voters of Nepal, and the middle class people, who are more concerned with safety, security and economics rather than high pitched political rhetoric. The Maoists, who claim themselves to be the champion of the poor and indigenous communities, need to understand that their brief period of rule under Prachanda other than the Finance Ministry has not received high marks, not only within their own cadres but also among the middle class within and outside Kathmandu. One of the Maoist focuses has been shedding light on the differences between the poorest and the richest of society. However, they have failed to address the concerns of the middle class whose support is vital in any political setting.
It was the Kathmandu middle class that voted for the party and helped the Maoists win a majority of the seats in the capital during the CA election; and it was the same middle class uprising that forced them to withdraw their recent protests. The middle class, who are the foundation of a strong democracy as seen in India and the US, serve as the antithesis of the ideologue faction of the Maoists. However, if the global history of communism were to be the point of reference, ideologues within communist parties have lost to pragmatist communists. Pragmatist communists tend to gain sympathy through their political and economic performance while the rhetoric of ideologues stirs anxiety and uncertainty. The Maoists will be a stronger force if they understand this earlier.
(Dhakal is a freelancer)
Posted on: 2010-06-28 12:40
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