Oped»
Presenting Option X
MAY 15 -
In the article “Issues of integration” published on June 24, 2008 in The Kathmandu Post, I had highlighted the importance of timely rehabilitation/integration of Maoist combatants: “The issue of rehabilitation and integration of Maoist combatants is the most crucial determinant of political stability in Nepal. As long as this strategic subject remains unresolved, there can be no enduring political stability, which is a pre-condition for achieving lasting solution to other vital issues confronting the nation-state.”
Further, highlighting the complexities and intricacies of troop integration and the fundamental concerns and intentions of the stakeholders — the Maoist party, the Nepal Army (NA), other political parties, the international community and the general public — I had suggested a number of options for timely rehabilitation/integration of Maoist combatants. These options were:
Option 1. Train and prepare all the Maoist combatants as verified by UNMIN and integrate them into the security forces.
Option 2. Train and organise the qualified members (19,000 plus) of the Maoist army into compatible units and formations under the security forces (SF) or some other appropriate command, and then integrate them into the appropriate SF after they have been fully trained and prepared (bulk integration).
Option 3. Creation of paramilitary security forces like Border Security Force (BSF), Highway Security Force (HSF), Industrial Security Force (ISF), Environmental Protection Force and so forth (out of the qualified Maoist combatants and the SF).
Option 4. Train and integrate only those combatants who meet the prescribed criteria into the SF, and rehabilitate or integrate the rest into other sectors. (Integration may be in bulk as desired by the Maoists or otherwise, i.e., at random, as desired by other political parties, now).
Option 5. Systematically reduce the size of the NA to an appropriate size (as per the national security policy/doctrine), and simultaneously rehabilitate and integrate the Maoist combatants into sectors other than the SF, within a stipulated time frame.
Option X. A combination of any two or more of the above mentioned options could be other feasible options — X1, X2 and so forth.
All these options are still valid as they relate to the concerns of the stakeholders. However, no single option can address the concerns of all the stakeholders. For instance, Options 1 and 2 could be acceptable to the Maoist party only. Option 4 could be a preferable option for the Maoist party if it leads to bulk integration, but other political parties may accept it only if it is
random integration across various units of the SF. However, Options 3 and 5 could be acceptable to both the Maoists and other political parties provided they are ready to reconcile their minor
differences in the larger interests of the country.
It means the best option could be Option X, i.e., a combination of Option 3 (creation of new paramilitary security forces out of the qualified Maoist combatants and the SF) and Option 5 (downsize the NA to an appropriate level over a stipulated time frame). In essence, this option means creation of paramilitary forces (especially the BSF, ISF and HSF as urgently required by the country) to incorporate all the qualified Maoist combatants and simultaneous reduction of the strength of the NA to about 50,000 (the pre-conflict strength of the NA) within a given timeline.
This Option X, which is most likely to address the concerns of all the stakeholders, is economical and contributes to the vital requirements (e.g., security of the border, industry and highways) of the nation. Most importantly, this option addresses the Nepali public’s genuine concerns, which I had outlined in my aforementioned article: “The Nepali public is concerned about the indefinite existence of the Maoist combatants and the size and democratisation of the Nepal Army. The people are also concerned that some political parties are trying to politicise the Nepal Army chain of command, and that Nepal cannot sustain the present strength of the Nepal Army together with the Maoist troops. The public wants peaceful rehabilitation and integration of Maoist combatants and management of their weapons as soon as possible so that peace and security can prevail. They also genuinely want that the Nepal Army is democratised and cut back, and that it be fully loyal to the Constituent Assembly.”
Downsizing the NA from the present strength of 90,000 plus to about 50,000, and organising, training and raising professional paramilitary forces (out of the Maoist combatants and the SF personnel) needs to be done simultaneously. The assistance of the UN or SAARC could be utilised for raising, training and organising the paramilitary forces, which could be placed under the command of the “Special Committee on Integration” initially and then under the National Security Council till they are well established.
Achieving these tasks, which relate to core national interests, will take time — perhaps a number of years. However, a firm and foolproof plan for these tasks can be made to resolve the present political deadlock, thereby enabling the Constituent Assembly (CA) to go ahead with its most vital task — writing the constitution. That plan must be endorsed by the CA. Moreover, the UN and SAARC could be included in the agreement to monitor the commitment of the stakeholders and ensure accomplishment of the plan as per the stipulated timetable.
Practical solutions to real-life problems like managing the 19,000 seasoned Maoist fighters and drastically reducing the size of the NA is bound to be full of antimonies, transcending common sense, logic and principles. Any tactical/expedient solution (e.g., integrating a few thousand Maoist combatants into each of the SFs) could ultimately open a Pandora’s box. We require a solution that ultimately leads to peace and permanence. This cannot be accomplished overnight as sought by the tactically oriented Nepali political leadership and intelligentsia.
In the context of the live situation Nepalis are painfully experiencing today, what we really need is a wise solution based on “not either-or but the-one-and-the-other-at-the-same-time” (Schumacher: Small is Beautiful: a Study of Economics as if People Mattered). All the stakeholders must be accommodative to reconcile their egocentric differences for the larger interests of Nepal. This must be done before impending disasters — constitutional crisis, anarchy, civil/religious/ethnic wars, state disintegration and disappearance of the nation-state — overtake us.
(The author is a former Army Officer)
rdlimbu@yahoo.com
Posted on: 2010-05-16 08:27
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