Editorial»
Ten tests for a successful negotiation
DEC 11 - With two dialogues between the government and the Maoists behind, observers of the Nepal scenario are left wondering: How long is it going to take a third round of dialogue to get off the ground? Will it or will it not? Or are we already at the brink? By now, one can safely surmise that greater the delay in resolution of the issue, the heavier the toll it is going to claim. Also, larger the number of dialogue failures, the heavier the intensity and magnitude of the violence that may follow.
Given the gravity of the situation, the time has come to consider the issue of formulating the framework of dialogues seriously and to put in as much of homework into the matter as possible. If, therefore, the intention is indeed to approach the issue of dialogue with the seriousness that it deserves and demands, ten criteria, as a sort of tests, will have to be considered by which one could foretell whether or not the next round of dialogue would really succeed.
First and foremost, is the element of trust, which may not necessarily be at the level desired at the time when the dialogue starts, the level at which the mediators and the facilitators are assumed to begin their operation. But, if someone ventures forth the prediction that the exercise is bound to fail just because there is not enough trust between the negotiating parties, such contention would be tautological. Lack of trust is the key challenge for the mediators and the major rationale for their assignment. It is why they are there. Had thee been adequate trust, neither the mediators nor the facilitators would have their job. The central role for the mediator in such a situation will always be to cultivate, nurture, and consolidate the level of trust between the contending parties and do nothing that erodes it even minimally. Suffice, however, to say that without a minimum level of trust building, there will be little movement forward. Needless to say, trust does not develop overnight and takes its time to grow. It has to be cultivated step by step, patiently and cautiously. In the case of the Maoist issue, for instance, very little effort appears to have been put into addressing this dimension of the problem. But it is clear now that unless a workable strategy is devised in that direction, there is little hope for progress.
After trust comes timing. Is the situation ripe for the dialogue to start? No amount of mediation is going to work if the moment when it is started happens to be the wrong one. Whereas the timing factor itself is the product of a whole host of variables, one cold still argue that in every conflict situation a moment arrives where both parties agree to hold the dialogue. Is it the equilibrium in the war of attrition or is it a stalemate when both feel that they are losing heavily? It may certainly not be easy to catch the right moment, but unless the mediators are able to catch it, the talks may always go wrong.
The third element is the quality and quantity of homework done - preparation for the negotiations. This in turn means building a whole system upward where there is none, which poses another challenge for the mediators, including organisation, network, communication system, resources and funding, humanpower, policymaking, planning, programming, code of operation and behavior, and rules of the game. document ~ ~ ng and minuting can bear crucial significance, a point vindicated by the five kilometer issue that turned out to be the Achilles’ heel in the second round of dialogue. If that history is not to repeat itself, there are quite a few lessons in the two previous dialogues for the future mediators and negotiators. Also, the more critical the situation, the larger the preparation needed.
How much congruency exists between the sets of demands put forward by the two parties is another test. Are the demands just positions taken to move the ball forward? Are they statements of interest, or are they the fundamental basic needs, unlikely to get scaled down in the course of negotiation? The mediators must be able at this point to use their insight to see through the veneer of communication that goes back and forth between the two parties, not to confuse one for the other, and read between the lines. Their job is not only to increase trust as much as they can do, but also the increase congruency, or compatibility between the two rival sets of demands put forward.
Fifth is the question how much power can be operationalised in the game of negotiation and in what possible way. Balancing the argument of possible use of power can be a matter of debate, but power mediation often works to conclude a negotiation, a point that was amply vindicated in the Kosovo crisis.
The sixth element in this list of tests is of strategy used to transform conflict for building peace. This implies a whole set of activities - from disarming and demobilisation (D2) to repatriation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation (R4).
Following the previous six criteria is another set of four elements - the role of external stakeholders, the role of negative stakeholders (power and arms mafia that want to see the conflict escalate because they will gain), the part being played by the wrong kind of stakeholders (political actors who may mimick as genuine peacemakers, but may be only posers in the game of negotiation keeping out those with true stakes or genuine riles to play), and that of the primary stakeholders (that is, the two rival parties, the mediators, and the civil society or the mass public).
Each one of these four kinds of roles also matters for the success of any dialogue. Infact, a lookback will make it clear that it was the interplay of the wrong kind of stakeholder roles and wrong strategies that aborted the two past dialogues whose ultimate fate was not very hard to prognosticate right at the start.Posted on: 2003-12-11 02:23
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