Editorial»
SAARC : Prospect and retrospect
DEC 10 - Now that the 12th summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Islamabad, January 4-6, 2004 is a certainty here are some recollections about SAARC’s history and stray thoughts about its future.
TWELVE, NOT EIGHTEEN
To begin, the summit would be the twelfth of its kind in eighteen years. That means that six annual summits were not held as originally scheduled. Therein hangs a tale. It tells a story of unresolved bilateral issues between the SAARC Seven. It hardly requires the acumen of an Einstein to surmise that unless the regional organisation gets its act together and comes to grips with that stinging nettle, all airy rhetoric about SAARC’s scintillating future will remain just that: hot air.
Clearly, SAARC must give urgent consideration to instituting a conflict resolution mechanism, even if that has to come via an amendment of the SAARC Charter. While it is no secret that India has been particularly loath to accept such an idea – principally because of its apprehension that SAARC diplomacy will then turn out to be exercises in India-bashing – there is no way that SAARC can really take off sans such a provision.
After all, not only are conflicts likely between neighbours by the sheer imperative of geography; they need to be nipped in the bud before they assume proportions that can derail the whole regional co-operation endeavour. In any case, one may recall that ASEAN member states discuss their problems without affecting their organisation. In other words, it should be possible for some of the best minds of the world to devise a supple mechanism to “kill the snake without breaking the stick” – to paraphrase a well-known nugget of regional wisdom.
It will be salutary to recall some SAARC history especially for the benefit of members of the younger generation. Both India and Pakistan were, at the pre-launch stages, loath to join the regional co-operative body if for vastly different reasons. Indeed, as much was admitted to a group of visiting Nepalese journalists (self included) by Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq in April 1983 in Rawalpindi. He confessed that, initially, he believed the idea of such a regional set-up was linked to India’s interest in bringing in Afghanistan into the proposed South Asian cooperation fold.
Given India’s close linkages to the erstwhile Soviet Union with its armed presence in Afghanistan, post 1979, claims by Indian strategic thinkers such as Bhabani Sen Gupta that “Pakistan now sees the Soviet Union as a South Asian power, with permanent political and security stakes in the region.” (Vide my column in The Rising Nepal, July 8, 1983), such as assumption on Pakistan’s part was hardly unnatural.
MORE BACKGROUND
On the Indian side, its initial reluctance to go with the flow was conditioned by apprehensions, as, for example, is reflected in a Hindustan Times article on July 14, 1983 by Apratim Mukharjee. In the said piece, Mukharjee quoted unidentified diplomatic sources in Calcutta to establish that Dhaka was plotting the creation of an anti-Indian bloc, including Nepal and Bhutan, both of whom had supposedly been told to woo China! Thankfully, the “ganging-up by six against India” theory was subsequently punctured thereby allowing for the birth of SAARC on December 8, 1985 in Dhaka.
Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman’s yeoman’s role in the creation of SAARC is, of course, well known and document ~ ~ d. Yet, today hardly anyone recalls that his initial efforts in that direction were timed, significantly enough, against the backdrop of the armed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan – which, incidentally, is why both New Delhi and Islamabad were somewhat suspicious, though for opposite reasons.
Furthermore, what is generally lost in the fog of time past is the role that the late King Birendra played in the conceptualisation of SAARC. Thus, if Rahman’s contribution was that of principal architect of the regional organisation, credit must go to King Birendra for first publicly sponsoring the concept of cooperation in the region around Nepal. Specifically, his proposal of 1977 was for regional cooperation in the utilisation of water resources of the region, including China.
But, perhaps precisely for that reason it was difficult to sell, especially to an India then still deeply suspicious of China. Indeed, one need note that, even today, co-operation in the crucial area of water resources within the SAARC Seven is non-existent, what to talk of co-operation with China in that regard.
In fact, such meaningful co-operation has only been advocated at the sub-regional level in schemes such as the South Asian Growth Quadrangle, comprising Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Bhutan. These days one does not hear too much being said about it, although when it was floated many, self included, viewed it as a means to isolate Pakistan, even at the cost of virtually undermining SAARC.
SOUTH ASIA
Interestingly, a study of the brief SAARC Charter brings out one telling fact: there is no definition of what exactly constitutes South Asia. Possibly, it is as much a reflection of difficulties in that regard from a purely geographical or definitional point of view as it is to the desire of the Founding Fathers to leave room for future expansion.
Indeed, at one time, India had been an ardent advocate for Afghanistan’s inclusion. Myanmar’s hypothetical association was undermined with its formal entry into ASEAN several years ago. Would India revive her interest in Afghanistan’s entry, assuming that Pakistan okays it? What if Afghanistan herself makes a formal application to do so?
Even assuming that Islamabad is not averse to having Afghanistan join SAARC, knowledgeable sources argue that Kabul is not quite ready for such a quantum leap into the unknown. Among the reasons spelt out in that context are: Kabul has not, thus far, demonstrated such an interest; that is not prepared, at this stage, to take on full responsibilities of membership; and, finally, that SAARC membership may not be cost effective at a time when her main focus is on domestic stabilisation and reconstruction.
As one gets closer to the summit itself, it is looking increasingly likely that Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan may, indeed, meet on the sidelines of SAARC XII. In any case, that the former has officially indicated he will participate is propitious, especially considering his past stance in that context.
One leading SAARC expert thinks that, partly, the shift in stance can be explained to the increased “pressure” from the United States and China, both of whom desire peace and stability in South Asia, especially on the Indo-Pakistan front. Be that as it may, what seems undeniable is the world’s Hyper Power, the United States, has, post-9/11 enhanced interest in South Asia – a state of affairs that has had a bearing on Nepal’s battle against Maoist insurgency. What is incongruous, though, is the lack of American interest in SAARC. The only occasion when this seemed not to be the case was during a fleeting solitary visit by a senior State Department official in the dying days of the Clinton administration.
Will that change? Does SAARC have future really worth looking up to? Let’s wait and see without being either wildly enthusiastic or unduly pessimistic.Posted on: 2003-12-10 02:13
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