Expensive amnesty
The political parties have been reluctant to prosecute for wartime abuses since the very beginning of the peace process. But there have been specific circumstances in recent months that have made the Maoists increasingly antagonistic towards the demands made upon them by human rights activists.
A turning point can perhaps be traced to the period of the Jhalanath Khanal government, when human rights defenders sought the resignation and prosecution of the Maoist minister Agni Sapkota. Before this the Maoists were somewhat open to the idea that some of their cadres would be prosecuted for the more egregious crimes committed during the conflict, mainly those involving a large number of deaths or committed without the knowledge of the party leadership.
Cases such as the murder allegedly committed at the direction of Agni Sapkota were part of their deliberate strategy to clear areas of their rivals and bring areas under Maoist control. Further, Agni Sapkota was not just one among the thousands of Maoist cadre who the party could use as a scapegoat. Having been active in the communist movement since the mid 1970s, he is a very important leader for the Maoists and is well-respected within the party.
It was thus the Maoist understanding that the Agni Sapkota case was political and thus one that, as mentioned in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, would be allowed amnesty. When human rights defenders started to demand that Sapkota be prosecuted, the Maoist understanding began to change. It became clear to them that according to international human rights law it was only deaths caused on the battlefield that would not be prosecutable. All of the murders committed by Maoist activists to clear areas of individuals from rival political parties and informers would be considered as crimes. This realization increased fear among the Maoists that many others in their leadership would be prosecuted as well.
Then, the Maoists felt that the efforts to prosecute Agni Sapkota and later Balkrishna Dhungel were politically motivated. There were some grounds for this claim: human rights defenders seeking punishment for these individuals were working closely with people who are viscerally anti-Maoist and whose political
motivation consists almost solely of undermining the party’s political position. This was another reason why the Maoists soured towards the entire human rights community and began to view it as inherently antagonistic towards their party.
One of the reasons why the Maoists also agreed to provide blanket amnesty to human rights violators in the Nepal army was so as to gain support for their effort to provide blanket protection to all of their cadres responsible for wartime abuses. Another reason is a change in political circumstances over the past two years. There was a time when the Maoists were demanding a radical reform of the army. This was complementary to demands being made by various human rights activists: they too wanted the reform of the Army so that human rights violators would be held responsible and abuses would be prevented in the future.
But there was a fundamental divergence between the Maoist and human rights activists. The former were more concerned with establishing control over the army, removing its feudal vestiges and making it more inclusive. Prosecuting for human rights violations was considered secondary. Then the Maoists realised that political circumstances did not allow for their attempt to radically restructure the army. Since then they have tried to be more conciliatory towards the Army leadership. Their agreement to an integration deal in which they virtually abandoned their original demand for the creation of a “new national army” is indicative of this.
As long as they were demanding reform in the Army, the Maoists appeared as an ally for human rights activists demanding prosecution of Nepal Army personnel involved in abuses. But when the former rebels abandoned their effort and instead sought reconciliation with the Army, an important political avenue through which human rights activists could pursue their demands was shut.
It is these shifts of view among the Maoists that are primarily responsible for the decision of the government not to extend the term of OHCHR and to reach an agreement with the Nepali Congress to amnesty all wartime atrocities.
This is an unfortunate state of affairs. Of course, prosecuting for wartime abuses is an immensely difficult task in all countries that have gone through civil war. It is always difficult to find a balance between providing justice and providing amnesties for the sake of broader political stability. But the provision of blanket amnesty for all human rights violations forecloses the possibility of reform within the Nepal Army. Great anger will also continue to persist among large sections of the population who suffered from the conflict and this will manifest itself in various ways in the future. The decision to allow for blanket amnesty will also undermine the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: being toothless, it will simply become a formality that will not assuage the demand for justice. Like the decisions by previous governments to sweep the recommendations made by the Mallik and Rayamajhi commissions under the carpet, the recent government decision will likely be remembered as an accommodation of mutual benefit between newly powerful political actors and traditional elites made at the expense of a powerless population.
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