E-Kantipur

The 7-point agreement became possible only after a number of Maoist leaders — most notably party Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal — realised the limits of the pressure they could bring to bear upon the political forces ranged against them and decided that the costs of remaining intransigent on their original position were higher than costs of reaching a deal that represented a significant compromise. The original position was, of course, that the conflict between the Maoists and the state had reached a stalemate, that the rebels in fact had won a political, if not military victory. And as such, any deal on integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants had to entail

a comprehensive restructuring of the army, in which formal Maoist combatants would possess significant authority. Abandoning this position, it was always clear, would cost the party leadership the support of the more radical elements in the party as well as lead to some disillusionment among the cadre base.

On the other hand, refusing to reach any agreement until such terms were accepted meant that the peace process would be endlessly prolonged, that the energies of the party leadership would be consumed by the integration issue at the expense of all other matters, and that the Maoists would not be able to acquire the goodwill necessary from powerful elements in Kathmandu and beyond. Such goodwill was necessary in order for them to be able to run the state.

The ambitions and incentives of Dahal and Baburam Bhattarai, too, had changed in the five years since the peace process started. In 2006, they were leaders of a former rebel movement whose strength relied to a great extent on their army. Over the course of the following years, as they participated in elections, became publicly known and cultivated links with sections of society in urban areas, they became mass politicians with a much wider constituency to address. With other sources of political support, the importance of groups that played such an important role during the war — the Magars of Rolpa, for instance, or their People’s Liberation Army — decreased.

As the nature of their constituencies changed, so did the political ambitions of the leaders of what is now known as the party’s “establishment faction”. As in the past, Dahal wishes to become executive head of the country for a prolonged period and make a lasting impact upon Nepali society. While he holds on to his leftist beliefs, the dream of radical transformation appears to have receded, and given way to a desire to play a balancing role between different sections of Nepali society. Then, there also arose specific areas to which Dahal now wishes to contribute, which he had not envisaged in the past. His desire to play a leadership role in the development of Lumbini is an example of that.

To hold the entire political process hostage to the issue of the future of Maoist combatants, Dahal and Bhattarai thus realised, would only mean to inhibit the ability to pursue these new ambitions. Thus, over the past few months, they emphasised a swift completion of the peace process and made efforts to conciliate with the other parties and India.

The leaders of the radical section of the Maoists, in contrast, have taken a very different trajectory over the past few years. Having consistently held to the line that the goal is to take over the state through force, Kiran and his colleagues have appealed primarily to those within the party. Their efforts have been to establish greater control over the cadre base that has emerged through the war. They have made little effort to engage with or seek to understand other political forces or the wider population. Their refusal to participate in government has meant that they have not been exposed to areas that would test their governing abilities or change the nature of their ambitions.

Holding on to the original communist dream of establishing a Maoist-style New Democratic State, they have found it difficult to adjust to recent political transformations and to lead them. For example, while they do believe in ensuring greater inclusion of Nepal’s population in the state structure, they are deeply uneasy that the debates on inclusion focus now more on ethnicity than class. In addition, they believe that all movements for inclusion and rights should take place only under the leadership of the party. Their rigid stance means that they have made no effort to form allies with other groups. Neither are any of the newly-emerged political groups attracted to them. The Madhesi parties continue to feel antagonistic towards the radical Maoists. In contrast, Bhattarai and Dahal have made major efforts to cultivate Madhesis as partners in recent months, and the latter feel better disposed towards the “establishment faction” of the Maoists than to any other group. Considering how bitter relations were between the two only a few years ago, this is a significant accomplishment.

The 7-point deal therefore has to be viewed in the context of the evolution of the Maoist party since 2006 and as part of its desire to lead a broader section of Nepal’s population than before. The compromise they made on combatants can only be seen as a necessary one that will free them to pursue wider goals. Although the radical Maoist faction continue to have the ability to cause significant disruption, their political line thus has very little resonance among the wider population — public sympathy remains with Bhattarai and Dahal.

This may not, however, be a permanent state of affairs. Even at the present time, there are many on Nepal’s left who, while agreeing the 7-point agreement was necessary, feel that the Maoists have been forced to compromise too much. There is unease with the fact that the party has agreed to return all captured property, and even to provide compensation to those whose lands the Maoists seized, without being able to push for an agreement on land reform. In addition, the fact that that there has been no comprehensive effort towards the democratic transformation and control of the Nepal Army is also seen as a cause for concern. 

The establishment section of the Maoists therefore needs to demonstrate great caution in the days ahead. Their balancing act is a difficult one. It is necessary to establish good relations with other parties and powerful forces in order for them to be able to effectively lead government. In the process, however, they cannot be seen to abandon their original constituencies and become beholden to the traditionally powerful interests. This was what the UML did in the 1990s, and it was this that made many on the left abandon this party for the Maoists. If the Maoists, too, are perceived in the years ahead as taking this route, significant disillusionment will rise and will likely sow the seeds for the revival of the radical left wing.

    aditya.adhikari@gmail.com

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