E-Kantipur

Many Nepal observers feel that the country may be witnessing a strong revival of the right.  This is to a large extent because the media is full of opinion pieces and interviews of conservative and status- quoist intellectuals, activities of conservative political organisations, and news “reports” that often cite named or unnamed experts’ opinions to challenge and undermine progressive and inclusive reforms.

Of course, the conservatives and the status-quoist forces and organisations, such as the caste organisations of Bahun and Chhetris and armed organisations like the Nepal Defense Army, have increased their activities.  Political parties like the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal and Rastriya Janamorcha have attacked or resisted reforms. Members of the dominant groups who lead, influence or control the media, academia, human rights organisations, and bureaucracy have covertly or overtly campaigned or maneuvered to resist, obstruct or limit major reforms.  The failure of the political class to meet self-imposed deadlines for writing the constitution, the  middle-class frustrations about it, and the frequent annoyance vented by the Kathmandu elite at emerging challenges to their socio-political monopoly, provides a sense of the tide turning in favour of the conservative forces.

However, many organisations are active for reforms and diverse viewpoints exist in Nepal that are often ignored or omitted by the “mainstream” media and hence may not be in the radar of news recipients. For instance, the Federal Limbuwan State Council, whose demands are “radical” and hence news-worthy in most societies, organised 22 public mass meetings, beyond numerous interactions, press conferences, trainings, closed door meetings, dharnas, and bandas in a span of one year from mid-May 2010 to mid-May 2011. Except for the occasional coverage of the bandas etc., the groups’ significant activities by any standard hardly received much reporting or analysis.  Very few people outside the region of their operation are aware of the party’s rapid expansion. 

The electoral history of Nepal shows that conservative parties have not fared well. During the 1959 election, the Gorkha Parishad received 17 per cent votes while the Rastriya Prajatantra Party factions received 11 to 18 per cent votes in the three elections in the 1990s. In the Constituent Assembly Election, the RPP factions received less than 5 per cent of popular votes. The conservative parties might increase their tally from a nadir of 2008 in a future election, but the historical trend indicates that they have not been able to become a major electoral force. 

The conservative parties are unlikely to receive significant popular support in the near future elections as well.  Many Nepalis face inequalities, real or perceived, either in material resources and/or cultural realms.  Hence, most Nepalis seek changes in some realms to address the inequalities and injustice they face and meet their aspirations.  Political parties that have increased popular support are those whose promises for change appear plausible. This becomes obvious not only from the growth of the Maoists but also from the growth of the UML during the 80s and 90s, the Nepali Congress in the 1950s and the recent growth of the ethnic parties.  The considerable loss of popular support in 2008 by the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML also supports the thesis in reverse way. 

The Nepali Congress grew during the 1950s when it was a progressive party.  Among other things, it championed land reforms.  Today the Nepali Congress is a right of the centre party that appears to be the most conservative among the three large parties. Its vote share declined considerably from the 33 to 38 per cent it received in 1959 and 1990s to 21 per cent in 2008. Likewise, in the eyes of many former supporters and voters today, the CPN-UML is not a radical party seeking substantive reforms. Its vote share of 28 to 31 per cent in the 1990s declined to around 20 per cent by 2008. Conservative pundits are probably familiar with the Nepali electoral history and that may be the reason for their regular rant against “populism” when some political actors and organisations attempt to respond to popular aspirations.

The second factor that may influence electoral outcome is whether the parties have consolidated or not.  The conservative parties lost ground among certain sections of the population, and do not appear to have recovered or gained new ground, and still remain split while the Maoists have unified a number of smaller left parties and consolidated its organisation in newer arenas.  While the Madhesi parties have split, some parties of the indigenous nationalities may perform better in future as they have expanded and consolidated their nascent organisations.  The provincial competing arena that federalism will provide may help them appear and become viable.

The conservative forces’ path to political power in Nepal, however, has been the non-democratic route whether it was before 1951, during 1960-1990 or 2002-2006. The monarchy, the fountain of conservative power, is gone but in future, threats to democracy could come from the military or in other forms, such as “presidential” rule with the backing of the military, bureaucracy, the Kathmandu elite and urban “professionals”. The short non-democratic interregnum of the 21st  century, however, indicates that in today’s globalised, democratised world and in Nepali society, it may be difficult to sustain a non-democratic regime for long. 

This does not mean that the conservatives are powerless. However, domination or controlling non-democratic sectors may not be sufficient in an open polity.  The common people have the strength of numbers and they have occasionally used it. The dominant group and people misinformed through status-quoist campaigns or omissions have been repeatedly surprised by events that have unfolded. The world was surprised at the rapid growth of the Maoist rebellion. Then people became surprised at the success of the Madhesi movement, followed by the third major surprise within a decade when the Maoist emerged as the largest political force in the Constituent Assembly election.  If the Nepali media and academia were objective to some extent, they should have observed, recognised and covered the trends.  Similarly, people could again be surprised when the conservatives fail to achieve significant revival, despite portrayal of such in the media or when new organisations of the marginalised groups gain significant electoral victory.

Lawoti is co-editor of Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (London: Routledge, forthcoming)

Post Your Comment

Please note that all the fields marked * are mandatory.
* Full Name
* Address
* Email Address
* Comment
* Captcha	Get another CAPTCHA code
Note:	Comments containing abusive words or slander shall not be published.