E-Kantipur

The period after the 2006 Jana Andolan was meant to mark a sharp break from the past. Among the things that were meant to change was the behaviour of the political parties. This was a commitment included in, among other places, the 12-point agreement where the parties agreed to “learn from past mistakes.” This partially meant avoiding the highly damaging forms of intense political competition that had prevailed through the latter half of the 1990s until King Gyanendra took over total executive power in 2005. In order to avoid deadlock and policy incoherence brought about by rapidly changing governments, it was decided that in the interim—as long as all the problems left over from the conflict were unresolved—the parties would work together through consensus.

In the longer term, new institutions of state would be devised by the Constituent Assembly. These would help bring about a major shift in political party behaviour. The Maoists thought, for example, that by replacing the parliamentary system with one in which a directly elected president would run the affairs of the state, it would be possible for governments to remain securely in place for a substantial period of time, rather than being constantly embattled against other political forces. It was presumably expected that the opposition in the new set-up would demonstrate more maturity than in the 1990s, expressing their grievances against the government in a spirit of constructive criticism instead of, as in the past, going berserk and seeking to topple the government at every perceived provocation.

The politics of consensus did not, of course, hold. Disagreements over the future of Maoist combatants, the nature of the new constitution and over who was to control the state was more intense than imagined. In the absence of an enemy that all parties could unite against, the coalition against the monarchy rapidly fell apart. We are now in a situation very similar to that between 1994 and 1999, where with no party in a majority in parliament, all governments are fragile coalitions that are rapidly formed and dissolved. It is considered an achievement if a government, even if unable to achieve anything substantial, is able to simply remain in power for a period of a year.

There is a tendency to view the intense competition between the parties as a result of deep-seated differences, including interim issues regarding the peace process and the Maoists refusal to accept the rules of multi-party democracy. The longer the peace process continues, however, it becomes increasingly evident that the damaging competition and the rapid formation and dissolution of governments is due more to the fact that the parties have settled into old forms of political behaviour. The parliamentary system is also perhaps to blame. For, in a situation where governments are elected through parliament, and no party enjoys a majority in it, each party feels that it has an equally legitimate right to govern the country. When in opposition, the parties think of the governing coalition as having come to power accidentally, as a result of temporary political arrangements. And so it seems legitimate to seek to replace the governing coalition by whatever means necessary.

Meanwhile, the parties in government too come to think that their position at the helm of the state is accidental and temporary. And their behaviour reflects this understanding. This can be seen most clearly with the change in the Maoist party over the past few years. Having for years fought a war against the parliamentary system, they came into multi-party politics vowing to avoid the mistakes of the Nepali Congress and the UML. When they first got the opportunity to lead the government in 2008, the Maoists decided that even though theirs was a coalition government, and that too, during a period of a post-conflict interregnum, they would use their position to undertake as great a reform of the state as allowed by the circumstances. The faults of the Maoist-led government were many, it cannot be denied, but it is also true that it demonstrated an energy and purpose in striking contrast to the many coalition governments that had come before it. But the Maoists interfered and sought to bring about change on too many fronts and antagonised too many political forces. This process culminated in the effort to remove the Army Chief, and this proved to be the proverbial straw on the camel’s back — this step proved too much for the other parties to countenance and the Maoist-led government was brought down.

The Maoists behaviour when they next got the opportunity to participate in government, this time in one led by the UML’s Jhala Nath Khanal, was in striking contrast. This time the Maoists seem to have internalised the notion that theirs is a government formed accidentally, that it can be toppled at any time, and that there is no point at all in trying to achieve anything substantial through it. Rather, as the other parties did in the past, the Maoists seem to have come around to the belief that ministerial portfolios should be treated as resources to be distributed among themselves; to be taken advantage of as much as possible before another government comes to power. Once this belief gained ground, jealousies emerged within the party regarding the distribution of ministerial portfolios. In order to manage these jealousies, the party leadership has recently recalled some of its ministers and replaced them with others. Over the past six months, there have been three separate ministers of Peace and Reconstruction. There has been no thought regarding the damage such rapid turnover has on the morale and capacities of the bureaucracy. But if one believes that nothing can be undertaken through the institutions of the state anyway, that ministries exist simply to be used by politicians for their benefit and that of their cronies, the need to strengthen the institutions of state probably appears as an irrelevance.

The interim post-conflict period may not formally be over, but it is clear that the political parties are settling into forms of behaviour that

was “normal” in the context of the post-1990 political order. This may be regarded as a victory of the Congress and the UML over the Maoists. The longer the interim period continues, however, the more this behaviour will become entrenched. And even if the CA does eventually devise institutions meant to discourage such damaging political competition, they may not be able to make much of a difference.

    aditya.adhikari@gmail.com

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