E-Kantipur

India’s Foreign Minister SM Krishna is visiting Nepal from April 20-22. Considering that the deadline for the constitution is on May 28, Krishna has quite a difficult task ahead. Officially, India denies any interference in the internal affairs of Nepal but in practice, interference by its officials is common knowledge in Kathmandu.

Since the Maoists were purged from power in May 2009, India’s policy has been guided by its singular aim to keep them out of the government at any cost. Since no political formation without the Maoists could enjoy a two-thirds majority in the parliament, no substantive progress could be made. The Maoists, for their part, have not helped matters by resorting to rhetoric that Indian officials consider them “anti-Indian”.

In the last two years, India’s Nepal policy seems to have been adrift. What Nepal required was the attention of Indian political leaders. But the Indian leaders left it to the bureaucrats, who in the last two years have been presenting the situation in Nepal as hunky-dory, to handle Nepal-related issues. Foreign Minister SM Krishna, who is considered a light-weight in the Indian establishment, failed to make any impact during his first Nepal visit in January 2010. Heavyweights like Home Minister P Chidambaram and Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee had their cups full. Sonia Gandhi’s focus remains on forming a simple majority government under the Indian National Congress; PM Manmohan Singh, at best, has been tentative on Nepal. In an acknowledgement of limitations of National Security Advisor (NSA) Shiv Shankar Menon to resolve the Nepal crisis, Singh had dispatched Shyam Saran as his Special Envoy to Nepal in August 2010. But Saran, who himself was a contender for NSA, did not have the full brief. In the event, he stated the obvious—India would not object if the Maoists could prove their majority in the house.

India has engaged with the Nepali politicians who were already following New Delhi’s official line, with Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai the only exception to this rule. However, Bhattarai’s credentials have become increasingly vulnerable as the radical elements in the Maoists seem to be gaining the upper hand. He could not even serve as India’s interlocutor with the Maoists.

India has failed to use its experience with peace accords. It signed substantives peace accords with the All Assam Students Union (AASU) in 1985 and with the Mizo National Front (MNF) in 1986. Following these accords, the AASU leaders re-christened themselves as leaders of the Assam Gana Parishad and went straight from their hostel rooms at the Guwahati University to ministerial houses. The Congress, in a show of largesse, allowed MNF Chief Laldenga to become Chief Minister of Mizoram, but the MNF successfully formed the government on many occasions following elections. The AGP and MNF were as corrupt as, if not more than, other political parties. There is no reason to believe that the Nepali Maoists would have been an exception: allegations of corruption and abuse of power by the Maoists abounded when they were purged from power in May 2009. Further, across the country, India has been recruiting former insurgents into the security forces while it has been opposing the same with regards to the PLA in Nepal.

India’s reaction to the Nepali Maoists is reminiscent of its disastrous counter-insurgency policies of the 1980s. After the AGP came to power in Assam, India’s then Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau trained and armed the Bodo youths to counter the AGP. After two decades, the AGP remains a mainstream political party while the Bodos continue to wage war for a separate state even after the creation of the Bodo Territorial Council in 1993.

India, in a way, has only strengthened the Nepali Maoists in the short term. The Maoists remain the only party that is unlikely to suffer from anti-incumbency or charges that invariably come with power: corruption.

Indian officials, it appears, have also failed to understand the communist movements of the 21st century. Communism no longer appeals to the mainstream communities. Even China has not remained a communist country in the classical sense. In the 21st century, the Maoist movements in Asia have found strong support only amongst the indigenous cultural communities of the Philippines, the Janjatis of Nepal and the Adivasis of India. It is not that these communities believe in Maoism, but impoverishment and denial of rights provide fertile ground for the spread of Mao’s ideology. The Nepali Maoists played the master-stroke by declaring 14 autonomous states in December 2009 with a devastating impact—the non-Maoists Janjati organisations demanding autonomy were virtually decimated.

Foreign Minister Krishna now has a chance to start India’s course correction on Nepal. It must not overplay the fear of Chinese influence in Nepal under the helm of the Maoists. Apart from the Himalayas, the Chinese will take decades, if not centuries, to challenge the strong linguistic-religious-cultural relations between India and Nepal. China’s primary concern remains Tibet; its displeasure over the appointment of Lhar Kyal Lama as the State Finance Minister makes this amply clear.

India’s options are otherwise limited. It could help formation of a government that can adopt a constitution by May 28 and undertake further necessary measures. But any new extension of the Constituent Assembly will call into question the legitimacy of its members. And in the event of an election without the Constitution, the declaration of 14 autonomous states and the perceived victimhood of the Maoists could prove critical when people get out to vote. The rule by a president with an Indian-sounding surname, Yadav, is not an option for India. If India pushes this line, it might well be interpreted as an extension of Indian hegemony.

First and the foremost, Foreign Minister SM Krishna must assess the impact of allowing bureaucrats to run policies on Nepal that require decisive political interventions. India ought to realise that no one will come forward to clear up the mess it creates.

Chakma is the director of theDelhi-based Asian Centre for Human Rights

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