E-Kantipur

Some fear that Nepal could witness an escalation of violent ethnic conflicts. This fear is based not only on a large volume of attention-grabbing news about identity-related violent conflicts around the world but also due to a sharp rise in armed ethnic groups and violent rebellions in Nepal after 2006. While some marginalised groups have raised arms, fundamentalist outfits belonging to the dominant group have also engaged in violent acts against minorities. In this context, what are the future prospects for the escalation of violent ethnic conflicts? It is difficult to predict the future but we can discuss some possible scenarios in “new” Nepal based on literature on ethnic mobilisation and conflict and Nepal’s specific context.

Violent conflicts

The irony of the 2006 peace settlement between the Maoists and government has been that even though it ended the armed conflict, it unleashed ethnic violence. As the table shows, the total number of killings in the country has declined since 2005. But that is largely due to the dramatic decline in the number of killings by the Maoists and the state compared to the civil war years. A review of violent acts by non-Maoist-non-state actors shows that violent acts by them have increased during the transition period. Armed ethnic groups are engaged in many of these incidents, which involve killings, abductions, threats and beatings. The non-Maoist-non-state actors are responsible for a higher number of killings than the state and Maoists since 2006, the year the Maoists signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The non-Maoist-non-state killings have generally increased compared to earlier years and have remained higher than 400 every year between 2007 to 2009.  Many of these conflicts are directly or indirectly related to people’s aspiration for recognition.

The Tarai has been affected more by violent conflicts. Among the various names of groups responsible for killings in INSEC’s annual human rights yearbooks, very few non-Madhesi groups are listed.  According to INSEC, the Federal Limbuwan killed one person in 2007 while two factions of National Defense Army (NDA), a Hindu extremist group, were responsible for four killings in 2008.  The rest of the killings by non-Maoist-non-state actors were perpetuated by Madhesi armed groups. 

Transition turmoil

Mobilisation and conflicts are high during transition due to heightened uncertainties. And if the ongoing transition comes to an end, the number of violent conflicts may decline, at least for some time—if the polity begins to stabilise. Once the new Constitution is promulgated, many groups who had mobilised to influence the constitution-making would reduce or end their activities because some of their demands would have been met or they perceive that opportunity has passed.  It will be more difficult to amend the newly formulated laws. The gradual stabilisation of the polity could improve the law and order and reduce violent conflicts.   

This scenario, however, assumes that the new Constitution will be more or less accepted by the broader society.  This assumption may be simplistic though. As demonstrated by the success of Madhesi mobilisation, ethnic/national groups could challenge the new Constitution if their major demands such as autonomy are not granted.  After two decades of expansion of organisation and mobilisation, the ethnic/nationalist groups could pose a serious threat to the new Constitution.     

As marginalised groups assert their rights and mobilise to demand concessions, the dominant group may perceive that they are losing out.  Some may challenge the progressive reforms and indirectly argue for status quo, as the mainstream Nepali media has done. Others extremist groups like the NDA have already targeted minorities like Muslims and Christians. 

Political structures and violence

The political structures adopted by the Constitution could determine the level and type of conflicts.  Cross-national studies have shown that small level conflicts (protests etc.) are higher in federal countries while violent rebellions are more often associated with unitary structures. Provincial governments are closer to the people and it is less costly for people to try and influence them through protests and other forms of mobilisation. Hence the number of peaceful protests and mobilisation increases in a federal dispensation. The provincial governments address some of the problems and reduce alienation and hence prevent violent rebellions. The number of protest activities, on the other hand, is generally low in unitary states because it is comparatively more costly to influence a distant government. As a result the grievances may continue to fester.  Some of the disgruntled groups eventually launch violent rebellions in unitary structures if alienation grows. 

This suggests that the environment for violent conflicts could reduce in a federal Nepal but the country may see an increase in various forms of protests. In this sense, those who fear an increase in conflicts in the “new” Nepal may be partially correct, since the number of non-armed mobilisations and conflicts like collective protests may increase. Peaceful protests are not detrimental to society and democracy, however.  As the cross-national findings show, peaceful mobilisation could, in fact, erode the basis for violent conflicts if some concerns of the protesting groups are addressed.

Different types of federal structure could incite different types of mobilisation. If the Constitution adopts a model that denies autonomy for various ethnic/identity groups, the country could witness a joint movement by larger ethnic/regional groups such as Limbu, Tamang, Tharu and Madhesis. On the other hand, even if a federal model with autonomy to a number of groups is granted, the country could see some mobilisation over borders of provinces as adjacent groups, such as Newar versus Tamang and Limbu versus Rai/Khambu, claim some of the same territories. However, the conflict that may erupt because of denial of autonomy could be more widespread and disruptive than the conflicts over borders. Likewise, in the case of Tarai/Madhesh, conflict is bound to appear between Madhesi and Tharu even if Tarai/Madhesh areas are not incorporated into provinces constituted with hills and mountains. On the other hand, if provinces composed of hill-mountain-Tarai favoured by top CHHE political leaders of Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and CHHE in general are formed, the mobilisation against such a model would be greater as both Tharus and Madhesi would oppose it.

 Whether identity politics in Nepal would turn violent depends on accommodation or rejection of people’s aspirations for identities. The paradoxical nature of identity politics is that its accommodation leads to it becoming less salient as groups compete among themselves for control of autonomous ethnic provinces and engage in everyday governance while non-accommodation could escalate ethnic violence by uniting different factions and groups for a common cause of ethnic autonomy.     

Lawoti is the co-editor of Ethnicity, Inequality, and Politics in Nepal, Himal Books, 2008

Killings by non-Maoist-non-state actors, 2005-2009

Year    Non-Maoist-non-state actors    Maoist    state    Total

2005    370    677    813    1,860

2006    327    271    304    902

2007    514    14    37    565

2008    491    1    50    542

2009    431    1    41    473

Source: INSEC (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010); the killings by the Maoists do not include by those perpetuated by its youth and student fronts (8 in 2008 and 2 in 2009 by YCL)

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