Halfway there
The successful conclusion of the peace process depends upon the transformation of the Maoists from an armed group to a political party that shuns extensive reliance on violence to enforce its policies and programmes. Commentators often look at Maoist Party documents and the speeches of its leaders to assess the party’s objectives and trajectory, including its transformation into a non-violent party. Such an approach could be useful to learn the formal position of the party and various factions within it, but one has to be careful what can be inferred from such information. Formal postures often do not equate to actual or intended positions on issues. Public documents and speeches are often deployed for the consumption of the public and to construct and portray a certain public image while at other times political parties and leaders are constrained by internal and external factors from fulfilling public declarations and commitments, even when their intentions
are sincere.
Maoist documents and public speeches, including recent ones, have to be looked at with the objectives of the party and its leaders in mind, as well as the context in which the Maoists exist and operate. The Maoist leaders have repeatedly declared, especially when they were not able to get what they were seeking or were cornered or frustrated, that they will revert back to the armed rebellion. Such pronouncements naturally rankles many non-Maoists as it rekindles their fear of the violent Maoists of the armed conflict days. Many of their opponents believe that the Maoists will not be able to transform into a regular political party that does not rely on violence as its main tool.
Is the fear genuine? The question is how to get closer to the truth, in this case about whether the Maoists are transforming into a non-violent party. Looking at a number of factors and indicators, such as party and cadre behaviour in addition to the party’s formal position, is a better strategy for getting closer to the truth than making an assessment based on a single source of information. Looking at trends of violent activities of the Maoists can be more helpful in assessing whether the Maoists are transforming because they capture the party and its cadres’ actual behavior.
The data collected by the Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) can show trends in human rights abuses by the Maoists. INSEC has collected data on a host of Maoist human rights violations, but they do not have annual data on all violations since the Maoists signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2006. Fortunately, on five forms of human rights abuses INSEC collected time series data as well: killings, abductions, beating, threats and injuries. The information provided by the data is not only insightful because it portrays a clear trend, but it also captures validly the transformation in the Maoist party.
The figures indicating the trend in human rights violations help us to make two important points. First, the data shows that the Maoists are still engaged in various forms of human rights violations even after signing the CPA in 2006. In fact, the Maoists are engaged in a higher number of human rights violations as compared to most other political parties (except for Madhesi armed groups in some sectors). In addition to the violations for which time series data were available (as shown in the figure alongside), the Maoists were engaged in destruction of private and public properties, capture of private properties, denial of rights to assembly, violating child rights (engaging children in political activities and preventing them from attending school), and engaging in inhuman behaviour (rubbing soot on their faces, etc.). However, this data should be analysed in a proper context. One, the Maoist party was engaged in an armed conflict and it is naïve to expect violent activities from an armed group will completely and immediately halt soon as it joins a peace process. It takes time for an armed party to quit violent activities and overcome violent culture. Two, other major parties, like the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, were also engaged in human rights violations during the period, although to a lesser extent. In fact, before the emergence of the Maoists as a major political force, the CPN-UML used to monopolise coercive politics in the 1990s. A well known and undisputed example is the use of extensive violence by CPN-UML cadres, including against its coalition partners, to influence the local elections in 1997.
The second, and a more important factor in analysing the Maoist party’ transformation, is the fact that the Maoist human rights abuses have declined since 2006 when the party signed the CPA with the government. The 2006 data contains a high number of violations because the Maoists, despite scaling down their acts of aggression after reaching an agreement with the seven political parties in late 2005, were still engaged in violent activities against the royal regime and its supporters before the second people’s movement and signing of the peace agreement. Killings, abductions and threats by the Maoists, three of the five violations with available time series data, have steadily declined every year since 2006 to 2009. Beatings and injuries caused by the Maoists have also declined in 2009 compared to earlier years (2006 -2008).
This decline in human rights violation over the years suggests that the Maoists are transforming to some degree. They were relying less on coercive methods in 2009 than before. If this trend continues, they will rely less on violent methods in coming years. This is a positive step towards a less violent society, but the challenge is to reduce violent tendencies as much as possible. There still remains a significant amount of violence being perpetuated by the Maoists as well as other major political parties.
(Lawoti is the co-editor of Ethnicity, Inequality and Politics in Nepal, 2010)



















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