Without UNMIN
CrossrOADS
UNMIN will pack its bags in a couple of days, leaving the issue of PLA integration, NA supervision and democratisation, and management of CPA entirely in the hands of party politicians. The debate leading up to the Security Council’s decision to withdraw UNMIN has been both encouraging and discouraging, depending on an analyst’s allegiances, affiliations and acumen. Whether there is a hopeful or despairing prognosis for post-UNMIN Nepal, UNMIN’s absence at this heated political juncture is worth critical scrutiny.
While UNMIN was overseeing PLA’s entry into cantonments, the Maoists took advantage of its goodwill and neutrality to build its YCL cadre base with ex-PLA fighters, inducting many non-combatant youth in the cantonments as PLA cadres. Ian Martin, UNMIN’s first Chief, himself has admitted this. UNMIN may not have supported the Maoists knowingly, as its anti-Maoist detractors allege, but its presence certainly encouraged them to play their obfuscating games boldly, prolonging the crisis in the expectation that international largess for the PLA cantonments would continue forever.
The non-Maoists, on the other hand, especially Nepali Congress (NC) and its affiliated intellectuals and civil society members, too found an
excuse to blame UNMIN repeatedly for unnecessarily restricting the NA’s
workings and going soft on the Maoists. This charge against UNMIN hardened their position toward the Maoists because they too, ironically, felt that as long as UNMIN was there in Kathmandu, the ongoing stalemate will continue without any restraining effect on Maoist belligerence.
UNMIN’s imminent absence has risks that the Maoists and Nepal’s many independent intellectuals realise, but non-Maoists appear sure will ride out. If UNMIN’s presence indeed encouraged the Maoist dilly-dallying, then the Maoists should feel their wings clipped in its absence. But if they feel that UNMIN’s absence will corner them and put them at risk, as has been speculated by more than one intellectual and human rights activist, allowing the non-Maoists to ride roughshod over them, then the Maoist fear may be real, but unnecessary. The Maoists should realise that despite the unreliable conduct and extremist pronouncements of a few of their top leaders, they represent the forces of real change and that the
future of Dalits, Madhesis, Janjatis and many progressive elements of the
population depends on their transformation into a successful political party in a multiparty set up.
Whatever the calculations of national and regional geopolitical realpolitik, the other two scenarios in which the Maoists can be thrust may be possible, but definitely not desirable. If the Maoists stick to their hard-line stance of revolt without giving peace and constitution writing a chance, whatever their fate, the marginalised will not benefit. Nor will the country as a whole. The marginalised will definitely lose if the Maoists and their agenda are defeated.
For it is now clear that NC and its affiliate intellectuals do not favour the kind of transformation that marginalised groups want or Nepal needs, to create a level playing field. The UML is torn between the Maoists and NC in its ideologies and agendas, not knowing collectively what exactly it wants or where Nepal should go from here. NC more or less knows for sure: even its more progressive elements are not ready at this point to go beyond the quota system or affirmative action
policy of sorts to redress centuries of injustice and marginalisation. Many
in NC see everyone else’s demands
and agendas as ethnic. But their
own ethnicity and its privileges are invisible, couched as national identity and national heritage. It is ethnic history and national disguise.
In a situation like this, the Maoists remain the only hope for fundamental transformation; but only if their leaders rise above interpersonal rivalry and anachronistic thought processes and analyse the Nepali situation as original thinkers. But UNMIN’s absence has definitely not given a free hand to non-Maoist forces. If this has given the Maoists pause for thought, it has also put even more serious responsibility on the non-Maoists, especially NC and the intellectuals affiliated with it. NC is already under the shadow of suspicion regarding justice issues and fundamental transformation—especially those related to Dalits, Janjatis, Madhesis
and women. What will be the moral status of NC if the Maoists are run over
and justice issues shelved for some distant future? How will people who
have advocated UNMIN’s exit save face if regressive elements take over
after May 28? One can only imagine
the consequences, both in terms of discourse and action.
The UML can continue hemming and hawing, but NC will become the direct target of the marginalised, rendering its constituencies even thinner than before, nullifying the achievements of its recent national convention and stigmatising it forever as the enemy. Besides, it will confirm the skepticism of many who doubt the good faith of UML and NC in achieving a truly just, multicultural and democratic Nepal.
There is plenty of room to go off track in Constitution writing and the peace process. This will mean dire consequences—even more so for NC and the UML than for the Maoists—no matter how analysts gauge international and national calculations over Nepal’s ongoing political process. Any maneuver off course will create an ethnic monster, detrimental to all.
That is why, as a safeguard after May 28, there needs to be a contingency plan to build a new political party; a different kind of political party of intellectuals, marginalised ethnic constituencies, and progressives. More than a political party it should be a political and moral movement that can fill the place of the then-discredited political forces. Failure of the current political process will be the failure of the current political forces, turning Nepal into another disrupted, interrupted country often seen in Asia and Africa. So, while the coming six months is definitely a testing time for the obvious political forces, it’s equally a testing time for the post-1990 democratic public sphere. The Maoists will only be one of the many forces at risk if the present process fails to deliver. India, too, will forever be a moral loser and traitor in Nepali affairs. Nepali Maoists’ anti-India charges will be doubly confirmed if the path to constitution making, republicanism and new Nepal is disrupted.



















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