E-Kantipur

On Sept. 23, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal (OHCHR-N) issued a ‘Summary of Concerns’ examining 57 killings by Nepal’s security forces in the Tarai between January 2008 and June 2010. The report points to a persistent pattern of extrajudicial killings, and the government’s failure to fully investigate or prosecute those responsible. The report makes clear that the human rights situation is deteriorating and has been for some time since the improvement brought on by the end of the conflict.

These findings raise troubling questions as to why the OHCHR-N agreed to a significant weakening of its mandate (signed with the government on July 10), most notably to close the field offices outside Kathmandu. There are also questions as to why the OHCHR-N agreed to continue to work within the February 2009 cooperation agreement signed with the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal (NHRC). 

As part of the agreement, the OHCHR-N agreed to refer new cases to the NHRC and follow up the same with active cooperation and support of the latter. Handing responsibility over to the NHRC would require two conditions: firstly, the human rights situation had improved significantly (sufficient so that national institutions could function effectively); and secondly, the NHRC was capable of carrying out the task.

It is difficult to find evidence that either condition is fulfilled. In its 2009 annual report to the UN, the OHCHR-N expressed concerns over the NHRC’s ability to ‘undertake its caseload properly’ including a specific concern that ‘the Commission has not initiated investigations into nearly 75 per cent of cases referred by the OHCHR-N, including cases of alleged extra-judicial executions and torture’.  The factual reporting about the lack of capacity in the NHRC is telling.

The failure of the NHRC is an open secret. The Kathmandu Post listed corruption, cronyism, and incompetence as just a sample of its failings (“NHRC at war within” Aug. 20). More recently the media reported fresh allegations of ‘misbehaviour’ against female staff and more corruption at the executive level.

Even without these scandals, the idea of meaningful cooperation between the OHCHR-N and the NHRC is a fantasy. The NHRC has been the most vocal and antagonistic proponent of ending the OHCHR-N’s presence in Nepal. The OHCHR-N and the NHRC do not enjoy a cooperative relationship in any sense of the word.

Yet the OHCHR-N was not only content with talk of cooperation, but also agreed to limit its own role and close regional offices. A new US $2 million capacity-development project was agreed in July 2009 to be implemented jointly by OHCHR-N and UNDP.

The OHCHR-N’s role in agreeing the new mandate needs to be examined. In April 2005, the OHCHR was granted a strong mandate to set up a considerable presence in the country—its largest field operation to date. While its recent performance has been lacklustre, the OHCHR-N has had an enormous positive influence on human rights in Nepal. Its action led to a reduction in human rights violations during the latter part of the conflict. The OHCHR-N assisted in creating the democratic space for the Jana Andolan.

Moreover, the OHCHR-N enjoys a formal position in monitoring the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA is not an agreement that can be changed unilaterally by the government.  The CPA is ‘owned’ by two parties—the UCPN (Maoist) and the 22 parties. In changing the OHCHR-N mandate without consulting the UCPN (Maoist), the government expressly violated the CPA. The OHCHR-N made no public expression of concern.

It appears that the OHCHR leadership was content to accept whatever they were given and were looking for a way out of Nepal. This is despite the fact that the OHCHR had more than enough credibility to maintain its mandate, not least the ability to threaten a withdrawal should the mandate be so weak as to threaten human rights in the country.

With regard to the cases being handled by the NHRC, the regional rights bodies have noted with deep concern the OHCHR’s silence over mismanagement of the current exhumation in Dhanusha by the NHRC.

With regard to the training and capacity building, the OHCHR-N’s much trumpeted awareness training of the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force must be held against the results noted in the OHCHR-N’s September report. The report explicitly confirms what the OHCHR-N already knew: human rights violations perpetrated as part of police operations in Nepal are a complex institutional reform and sectoral issue. And in the absence of reform, awareness training doesn’t change an organisational culture.

OHCHR-N has of late lacked a clear strategy, capacity to prioritise, political analysis and external advocacy skills. The exceptional work that individuals and teams have put in at OHCHR-N has been dissipated by the absence of coordinated advocacy and political vision to follow through recommendations. Without this vision, the institution has drifted, spreading itself across an ever wider range of issues, often lacking a strategic logic and reducing resources for core tasks.

Rather than coordinating a strategy to secure human rights in Nepal, the OHCHR-N has managed to alienate natural constituencies in the international community and national NGOs. In place of a strategy that corresponds to the political reality of Nepal, the OHCHR-N appears to have fallen back into fulfilling the arcane log-framed requirements of the OHCHR HQ.

The OHCHR-N’s new mandate gives the government and security forces an easy answer to critics of Nepal’s human rights record. They can point to the substantial international human rights presence and that Nepal security forces are being trained by the OHCHR-N. The capacity of the security forces is being built and the problem is being addressed. In the meanwhile, the violations will either not be reported or under-reported by the NHRC. The government can claim an improvement. Since donors and diplomats new to Nepal report to their capitals that the government is working with the UN to address human rights, all the donors can plough money into the NHRC irrespective of however bad its functioning.

The response of the OHCHR Headquarters to all its weaknesses has been to engage in obsessive internal restructuring. Leadership is clearly part of any solution, yet the OHCHR-N has had no representative for months and there is no prospect of any new leadership in sight. The acting head has reportedly gone off on a study tour and won’t return until 2011. Stunningly, the leader of the OHCHR, High Commissioner herself, appears comfortable with its largest field office without a representative or Acting Head. If that is the response of the OHCHR leadership, it is indeed pertinent to ask whether the time has come for the OHCHR to close its Nepal Mission and be upfront about it.

(The author is director, Asian Centre for Human Rights, New Delhi)

Post Your Comment

Please note that all the fields marked * are mandatory.
* Full Name
* Address
* Email Address
* Comment
* Captcha	Get another CAPTCHA code
Note:	Comments containing abusive words or slander shall not be published.