E-Kantipur

The extension of the Constituent Assembly has postponed, not resolved, the crisis in Nepal. The underlying political tensions and increasing polarisation of politics in Nepal still remain to be bridged if the CA is to finish its task and the peace process completed.

In September 2009, the prime minister, addressing the Central Public Coordinating Committee on the occasion of the Dashain festival, stated, “A powerful armed group, the LTTE, is finished now, therefore, the Maoists should not show any kind of arrogance.” This sentiment has been often repeated in some political circles and in the press and the notion that there can be a nasty but short conflict to finish the Maoists is still growing. However, even in Sri Lanka, the final offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) took almost three years. It is difficult to be specific because there was no declaration of war — just a slide from a stuck peace process and ceasefire. The hostilities were in full force by the time the government of Sri Lanka declared the end of the ceasefire. It seems inconceivable that a Sri Lanka style military solution could offer anything to Nepal other than destruction and misery for several years to come. In that time, the complexities of federalism and ethnic tensions will have become even more complex.

In military terms, it is difficult to see any comparison. The LTTE were in one small area of the country only, communication and road links in Sri Lanka are vastly superior to those in Nepal — the furthermost point is no more than eight to 10 hours’ drive. There are no mountainous regions which are so suitable for guerrilla activity — as Nepal found in the “People’s War”. But more than this, the Sri Lankan army is battle-hardened having been in active combat with the LTTE for 25 years, in more recent times they have trained in jungle warfare techniques. At the beginning of the Sri Lankan war, the army was a largely ceremonial army — similar to the Nepal Army — it has taken years of bloody experience and training to change that. The Sri Lanka military had strong faith in the political leadership towards the end of the war and had strong military leadership totally committed to the strategy of winning the war by military means alone.

The role of the political leadership was equally crucial. The administration of President Rajapakse was absolutely decisive and united in its objective. The end period of the war was led by a government that was in full control politically and militarily. They were ready to spend money on the army and ran the country in debt to do so. The nature of the political leadership was the most significant difference with previous Sri Lankan administrations. The war had previously been fought with some respect for International Humanitarian Law and notions of civilian protection of the Tamil people in the middle. Previous administrations hesitated to order an all out onslaught that would kill and maim so many Sri Lankan Tamil citizens. President Rajapakse, primarily committed to the majority Sinhalese community, had no such inhibitions.

There are also important differences between the LTTE and the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). The LTTE’s policies were primarily militaristic without a strong political agenda in the later years, other than narrow nationalism. It is a party representing a single ethnic group. Though the UCPN (Maoist) pursued the “People’s War”, this was never devoid of political content; and the party attracted support from people of all ethnic groups of Nepal. Furthermore, the LTTE never subjected themselves to the electoral process as the UCPN (Maoist) did. Furthermore, the LTTE wanted to return to violence and talked of having a small war. However, they discovered that once war is unleashed, no single party remains in control.

In the geopolitical arena, Sri Lanka proceeded with its war policy despite the disquiet of Europe, the US and India and the condemnation of the UN. It did receive support from some non-Western countries — critically China. The international constellation is differently arranged in Nepal, but one can be sure that there will be an equal level of non-interference in war operations, though there will undoubtedly be words of condemnation. At this stage, only the Nepali leadership themselves can save the situation.

A return to armed conflict in Nepal would likely be messier and more prolonged than the “People’s War” itself. The UCPN (Maoist) have clearly demonstrated their reluctance to return to war, however, as one leader stated in conversation, “Neither are we ready to sacrifice ourselves” — so they could and would, if pushed, fight again. This time Nepal would face urban as well as rural guerrilla warfare which the army is not equipped to deal with. The added danger is that armed ethnic groups both in the Tarai and in the hills would also resort to fighting the state, if they felt that political avenues had collapsed.

In Sri Lanka, everyone is asking, “The state has won the war, but can they win the peace after such devastation?” In Nepal, there is a great danger that the peace will be carelessly lost, but it seems few are examining the consequences of doing so realistically.

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