E-Kantipur

There has been apprehension among the political class — not least within the Maoist party — that Girija Prasad Koirala’s death could possibly lead to further damage to the peace process. And although GPK’s place in the political sphere had steadily become more marginal in recent months (the three milestones being the formation of the Maoist-led government in September 2008, the souring of relations between parties caused by the attempt to sack Chief of Army Staff Rookmangud Katawal and the subsequent replacement of that government by a UML-led coalition in May 2009, and the resentments towards Koirala that arose within the Nepali Congress as a result of the appointment of his daughter Sujata as Deputy Prime Minister in October), it is clear that disaster could yet arise if the parties do not make major efforts to change course.

In particular, two negative outcomes could arise: first, in GPK’s absence the Nepali Congress could face internal turmoil and second, the relations between the parties currently in government — particularly the NC and the UML — and the Maoists could further sour.

There is first the matter of succession. Attempts to wean the party away from Koirala’s overwhelming influence began a couple of months ago, particularly since the election of leaders to the Parliamentary Party. As will be remembered, Ram Chandra Poudel’s victory over GPK’s choice Deuba was then taken as an indication that the party leadership had, to some measure, rejected Koirala’s leadership. Then, a battle for leadership of the party between Poudel, Deuba and Sushil Koirala also emerged.

With GPK’s death, there is a danger that this struggle will intensify. If one or all of them decide to take the approach adopted by GPK after 1990s, where he adopted a no-hold-barred approach in marginalising his rivals K.P. Bhattarai and Ganesh Man Singh, even if one of them succeeds in emerging victorious, the Nepali Congress as a whole will lose. For none of these leaders possess Koirala’s charisma or organisational ability, and the party body in its entirety will be unwilling to accept any of these individuals as its undisputed leader. There are already deep fissures within the party. It is well known that over two years after the party’s reunification, the Deuba faction of a party continues to operate to a large extent as a parallel entity. If the battle for succession becomes bitter and contested it is likely that the fractures will become severe, the party will lose whatever little organisational coherence it currently possesses, and it will be impossible for the party to take a coherent policy line, whether towards the Maoists or on other issues.

Then, there is a danger that the party will take a deeply partisan view of broader political currents and, taking actions it believes will strengthen the party, will do so to the detriment of the compromise and consensus that is necessary if the country is to enter a period of a stable and democratic peace. Since the beginning of the peace process, GPK ensured that those who harboured a deep grudge against the Maoists and were keen to use any means possible to harm them politically, were kept at an arm’s length from any significant role in policy formation or negotiation. These leaders felt betrayed, at least one of them — Govinda Raj Joshi — went on to publicly disown GPK as his patron, but there were others in the party who shared Koirala’s vision.  It was these individuals he used as his chief negotiators with the Maoists. Chief among these were Krishna Prasad Sitaula and Shekhar Koirala. Neither of them had a strong organisational base within the party, but as long as GPK was around this did not matter: after all, they had his authority to demonstrate flexibility in negotiations with the Maoists, even as others in the party seethed.

Granted, these individuals have gradually lost central importance since the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections of April 2008. There is, however, the danger that without GPK around to impress upon the party body the importance of remaining conciliatory with the Maoists, his vision and the individuals who shared in it will even be further marginalised. Hard-line tendencies may arise within the party, which, with the support of other powerful groups such as the Army, may decide that they will attempt to wear the Maoists down by adopting an intransigent posture, and not budge until the latter accede to terms dictated by the NC-UML alliance on issues regarding the constitution and the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants.

This process had already begun with the formation of the UML-NC governing coalition. Only after GPK put in major effort to form the High Level Political Mechanism (HLPM), an independent body consisting of the major political parties to discuss outstanding peace process matters, did serious negotiations between the government and the Maoists resume, and it seemed that this outlet would enable the parties to determine a way forward in common. Despite some progress made in the earlier stages, however, GPK’s ill health prevented him from playing an active role in the body, and the negotiations there soon ground to a halt. Now that he is dead, it is possible that the HLPM will become totally defunct. This will be unfortunate. It wasn’t easy for GPK to form the mechanism in the first place; if it becomes defunct, it will be exceedingly hard to create a similar body, the decisions of which will be authoritative and binding.

But then, when calamity hits countries riven by internal strife, there is often hope that the solidarity it generates will enable its leaders to come together, adopt flexible positions and agree on decisions that are for the long-term good. And so here too, once the period of mourning is over, perhaps the parties will come together to take a few common decisions that will create the space to enable the more difficult work on details required if a new constitution is to be drafted and general elections held in the near future. After all, all political leaders, no matter how narrow their perspective, understand that a return to conflict is not an option, nor the current stalemate indefinitely sustainable.

aditya.adhikari@gmail.com

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