Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Chhatraman Gurung is reported to have said that he cannot entertain the bulk entry of ex-Maoist rebels into the Nepal Army. This has enraged the Maoist party to the brim besides putting the elusive peace process further away from the so-called logical conclusion. This has brought a number of other political issues to the forefront. It is, therefore, time to review the situation from the right perspective.

What has encouraged a professional army head to make statements with political overtones? Is he the decision maker in the political process? Who gave him the authority? Is he liable for violation of the given jurisdiction? To whom is he accountable? Several such political questions come to the forefront. If the COAS has said what he is reported to have said on the basis of some sporadic statements by frustrated political leaders, it is deplorable because he cannot stand on the political line. If he has said it at the behest of the Indian COAS, it is outright preposterous. Nepal is trying to stabilise a fully democratic polity with the people as the sovereign power. Nepal has been turned from a kingdom to a republic with the power of the people, not the army. In fact, the army was standing-in-arms against a resurgent people who spearheaded the movement for the establishment of their republic.

Although the political process is taking a long time to come up with a new constitution, it has not derailed from its course. Along with the formulation of a new constitution, there is also the need to conclude the peace process. The political leaders and the members of the Constituent Assembly (CA) are working dedicatedly at full speed to finalise the constitution. In this process, there are bound to be expressions and weighing of different views from different parties and political actors. In this process, different leaders have expressed their view that the integration of the rebels into the Army may not be the right choice, and that there should be other options. But their views are not the determinant views, and such opinions are not even endorsed by their own respective parties. If the COAS feels that he has been encouraged by such sporadic views, he is gravely mistaken.

The Army used to be loyal to the king in the former polity of the kingdom because he was the sole authority, and he had kept the army as his personal guard. But with the departure of the king and the establishment of a republic, the Army has no option but to obey the people’s command. In a democratic republic, parliament is the final authority to make formal political decisions because it is mandated by the people and empowered by the constitution. The Army is, by all means, under the authority of parliament in normal circumstances. Any decision about the Army requires the endorsement of parliament.

However, Nepal is not running under normal circumstances. It is at the threshold of a big transition. A new constitution is in the offing, and the CA is the highest authority to create a new definition of the Nepali republic. In this light, the CA can define the shape and size of the Army. Nepal is a buffer state between two big nations to the south and the north, and keeping a big army is not the safest way to safeguard the frontier. Rather, it is to be protected through politico-diplomatic relations that Nepal will adopt. So, a decorative small army may meet Nepal’s need for ceremonial purposes. We may decide to have a neutral status like the Swiss Confederation in which case there will be no need for a fighting army. Even with a fighting army, Nepal cannot beat the giant neighbours on either side if there is a state of belligerency with anyone. So, having a small ceremonial army will be the most expedient option in the long run.

The chief’s comment can also be judged in the context of the peace process. The peace process meant a change in the status and style not only of the Maoist rebels but also of the Nepal Army. Both the Royal Nepal Army and the Maoist rebels were belligerent against each other. The main purpose of the peace process was to permanently disarm the Maoist rebels and integrate them into the Army on the one hand and to democratise the Nepal Army on the other (senako loktantrikaran garne). While the first part of the peace process is often mentioned, though not fully addressed, the second part is often forgotten or ignored. It should have been given equal weight during all phases of discussion.

Is the Nepal Army democratised? The erstwhile Royal Nepal Army has been turned into the Nepal Army and its former master has gone from the scene. But not much else has been attempted in the sphere of democratisation. The recruitment of armed personnel during the transition phase of the peace process was restricted, but the Army has moved ahead by enlisting new people for "vacant" positions. The peace agreement should have been fully observed, but the Nepal Army has not followed these provisions. The second aspect of democratisation is bringing the Army under full civilian jurisdiction. But it has refused to surrender to civil jurisdiction. There is a vivid display of defiance in several cases. Human rights violators are protected under the garb of army prerogative. The COAS has been giving political opinions.

The army is a professional institution, and it should have a sphere of autonomy in matters of its operation; but the institution must be brought under full and absolute control of the civilian political authority. The Army can provide professional and technical advice when asked, but it has no authority to give voluntary political opinions. The Army’s protection of an indicted official is a blatant violation of civilian authority, and this is in contravention of the democratisation process. This has added to the sphere of the prevailing impunity in the country. This has put a black spot on the face of Nepal as a law abiding country.

I am not trying to infer that the Maoist side has no lapses. In fact, it has had several lapses which have delayed the peace process. But the Maoist party is a political organisation, and it is negotiating and bargaining vis-à-vis other political outfits and the government. It is not the rebels who are causing the trouble. The rebels cannot be taken as an independent agency for negotiating the terms of the peace process. They are at the receiving end of the process. They must observe whatever options the political process settles on. Similarly, the Army is also at the receiving end of the process. It must accept whatever options the political process finalises.

What can be done with the rebels? They have fought for a cause under the authority of the massive political objective of bringing revolutionary transformation in the country. They were trained to follow the dictates of a certain authority. But that authority has changed. The Maoist party has turned into a mainstream political organisation with a democratic garb. They have become part of the Nepali government and society. So, it is futile to argue that the rebels will follow the same old ideology. The rebels are professionals, and will serve the purpose of the given political authority. The processual change will bring about ideological reorientation. With this reorientation, they can be equally good in the Army or in other security outfits. Or else, the government can create a special security force like a border security force or industrial security force and the like.

Khagendra N. Sharma

knsad1@gmail.com

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