E-Kantipur

Some days ago, I got my hands on a brochure published in 2009 by the National Water Development Agency (NWDA), an undertaking of the government of India under the Ministry of Water Resources. It was about the proposals for the Inter-Basin Water Transfer Project, also known as the River Linking Project (RLP). The brochure featured the proposed Inter-Basin Water Transfer Links under study with a total of 30 links (14 Himalayan and 16 peninsular components).

While scanning through the 30 proposed river links, I noticed that four of the links of the Himalayan component originated in Nepal (supposedly involving high dams here), and traversed Nepali territory before entering India. A fifth link was between the Mahakali and the Yamuna rivers, referred to as the Sarda-Yamuna Link. Of these five links, feasibility reports for two links have been completed. It was shocking still to know that while India has been busy drawing lines beyond the international boundary for its much talked about RLP, the government of Nepal has not been officially informed about it, let alone been included in any of the bilateral meets that have been concluded after these proposals were made public.

The most recent development involving the RLP is probably the Saptakoshi High Dam Multipurpose Project (SKHDMP). Among other purposes, this project was supposed to be part of the Koshi-Mechi and Koshi-Ghagra links. Although the Indian government has not yet officially acknowledged the fact, these brochures published by the entities of the same government speak clearly of its intentions.

As for the SKHDMP, there are numerous issues surrounding it. One is the dam itself. India has been sticking to its version of a 269-high dam as proposed by a study it conducted in 1981. However, a study carried out by JICA in 1985 pointed out that if such a dam were built, the dam site at Kurule for the Sunkoshi-Kamala Diversion Project would be submerged. The next issue is submergence that would be caused by such a high dam and the subsequent resettlement problem that needs to be addressed. It is estimated that some 19,426 hectares of Nepali land would be submerged as a direct result of the 269-high dam. Considering the population that would be affected and the resettlement issues, the task would definitely be daunting.

Next, there has been a worrying development in the 1981 Indian proposal. India has proposed a single barrage in Nepal and an east-west canal emanating from it to irrigate land in both India and Nepal. The canal, as it would be carrying water for Nepal as well as India (most of its discharge), would definitely be a large one. Given the irrigation needs of India, a canal with a capacity more than 500 cumecs would be required. Further, for a canal of the proposed discharge and length (some 500 km for the entire canal network in Nepal alone), an estimated 5,000 hectares of Nepali land would be lost. This figure could be augmented even more if the issue of water logging is considered. Apart from the population displacement due to the high dam and the canal, the issue of its impact on the existing infrastructures, including various operational irrigation projects needs to be addressed.

The current Indian stance on the SKHDMP has seriously downplayed Nepali sovereignty. Against this backdrop, it sounds absurd that India expects to use some 5,000 hectares of Nepali land for a canal to irrigate fields in Bihar besides submerging nearly 20,000 hectares under the main reservoir and a few thousand hectares under the re-regulation reservoir. Above all, the Nepal government hasn’t even been officially informed about this matter.

The primary interest of India in the SKHDMP is flood management and silt control. This has been the most important aspect of this project since the beginning. The SKHDMP was first proposed in 1946 by an Indian study, well before the RLP was proposed in the 1970s. Later, this project was supposedly integrated into the RLP for the aforementioned links. Even the current Koshi Barrage at Hanumannagar was constructed in light of the high dam project. It was proposed by K.L. Rao for silt control as well as gradient control along with its irrigational benefits. It was mentioned that in due time, this barrage would prove to be insufficient and a high dam was the only sustainable solution. Also, the RLP has previously been deemed techno-economically unfeasible. However, as India aims to increase the irrigation potential to 160 million hectares by 2050, and in light of the changed economic context, the RLP has been considered a techno-economically viable solution. Even the Indian High Court has given a verdict in favour of the project.  

Basically, the SKHDMP is an Indian priority project. If this project is supposed to work, the issues of benefit sharing must be addressed accordingly. Sadly, as seen from past treaties and agreements, it is clear that India has not been totally honest in this aspect. Benefit sharing has always been the toughest nut to crack during any of the treaties. Be it sharing the downstream benefits of the Mahakali, the Karnali or now the Koshi, India has till now been reluctant to share them. Regarding the Koshi, India has till now being downplaying sharing the benefits of flood and silt control. Maybe the Koshi deluge of the past year should be a real eye-opener in realising the extent of the benefits that India would receive from the SKHDMP and prompt it to address the issue with utmost sincerity and honesty.

When it comes to the international boundary, one should play by a different set of rules. The RLP, although it is a noble venture with respect to the Indian people, the Indian side must equally consider the aspect of Nepal’s sovereignty and should not try to dictate terms. Considering the changed political scenario where some elements have been instilling anti-India sentiments in the people as their political tool, India should not give them any further excuse to make another point.

When it comes to the RLP, the Indian stance has been somewhat like “we will let you know when you need to”. However, in the current case, when almost everyone knows about the project and brochures with the entire proposed layout have being made public, it’s disheartening that the Nepal government hasn’t been informed officially and that the government itself hasn’t taken up this issue at any platform.

Since the first meeting of the Joint Ministerial Commission on Water Resources (JMCWR) was not held as scheduled in January, maybe it’s time for a self-appraisal. Since the meet was planned by the fifth meetiommittee on Water Resources (JCWR), the commitment must be fulfilled promptly. And the critical issues that have so far been overlooked should not be forgotten.

peeyusht1@gmail.com

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