Red carpet welcome
Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal made his “political pilgrimage” to Delhi from Aug. 18-22, 2009. He is probably the weakest prime minister to pay an official visit to India following the end of the Rana regime in Nepal. More than 40 percent of the members of the Constituent Assembly (CA) are claiming that the Nepal-led coalition was formed in an unconstitutional manner and by an unethical political step of the ceremonial president. According to the constitution, any agreement or treaty made with a foreign country should be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the legislature parliament. Obviously, Prime Minister Nepal does not possess such a majority.
In this political milieu, India should have diplomatically refused the prime minister's request for even a goodwill visit. But India acted just opposite and enthusiastically welcomed Nepal in Delhi. The media and the intelligentsia in both Kathmandu and Delhi are curious why India was so keen to roll out the red carpet for Prime Minister Nepal even though he is the weakest prime minister and his legitimacy is being seriously questioned at home. In my opinion, this proves that political developments in Nepal after May 2009 were sponsored by India.
Why was the Maoist-led government in Nepal altered? According to Akhilesh Upadhyay, editor of The Kathmandu Post, it is easy to understand New Delhi's paranoia about the Maoist-led government's alleged China tilt. The political developments in Nepal are a result of India's growing unease over the global pre-eminence of China and its possible implications on India's security concerns. Like the asymmetry in Nepal-India relations, there is similar asymmetry in Beijing-New Delhi relations and that apprehension motivated India to alter the regime in Nepal. Brussels-based international think tank International Crisis Group (ICG) concluded in the same vein in its latest policy brief of Nepal.
The foreign policy establishment of India should bear in mind that India cannot fulfil its strategic interest and the national security aspirations of its citizens by making a majority of the Nepali people anti-Indians. Due to the Indian sponsorship in regime change, the people who favoured the Maoists in the last election, small parties who are in opposition to this coalition and a large section of the civil society, the intelligentsia, the media and the masses became anti-Indians after the May incident in Nepal. Such steps of Indian foreign policy turn more and more Nepalis into anti-Indians.
Nepal is not only vulnerable politically; it is equally so in trade and commerce with India. Nepal is the largest trading partner of India in South Asia. In the first 11 months of the last fiscal year, Nepal’s trade deficit with India reached nearly Rs. 107 billion. The total trade deficit with India may reach nearly Indian Rs. 100 billion next year. This amount is about 3.5 percent of India’s trade balance to its total external sector. In this situation, India does not want to further deteriorate its balance of payments granting a unilateral concession to Nepal in trade. Similarly, Nepal is supplying four million cheap and crude labourers to the primary and manufacturing sectors of India, and if this workforce is withdrawn, the wage induced demand pull inflation may lead to destabilization of the Indian economy. So India always creates hurdles to limit economic growth to monopolize Nepal’s market. For any country to become economically prosperous, political stability is a precondition; and India always wants politically instability in Nepal. This is a fact that India does not want to see Nepal economically prosperous, and Indian sponsorship of the latest political development should be understood in this light.
Events in Nepal are proceeding at such a pace that it is time for policymakers to evolve a new paradigm to cope with the avalanche. New Delhi’s policies have veered from Indira Gandhi’s version of the Monroe Doctrine to I.K. Gujral’s benign engagement on the primacy of economic interaction in trumping political disagreements and differences. None of these approaches are adequate for the transformations in progress limiting Nepali diplomatic engagement with other counties. The Monroe Doctrine is outdated and impractical now.
Most foreign policy experts of South Asia and even Indian-retired senior foreign service officers think that Indian policy towards neighbours has suffered from a sagacity of “superiority” or “Big Brother”. Prime ministers and foreign ministers often feel hesitant in visiting neighbouring countries. After Prime Minister Gujral’s formal trip in 1997, no Indian prime minister has visited Kathmandu. Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Kathmandu in 2002 to attend the 11th SAARC Summit only. How many Nepali prime ministers have visited India during this period? Senior diplomats falter being gracious and chivalrous towards their neighbouring counterparts in bilateral and the multilateral engagements and articulations. However, India became so suspicious when Prachanda participated in the closing ceremony of the Beijing Olympics last year. He was forced to admit that his formal trip would be to Delhi. This clearly shows the asymmetry of Kathmandu-Delhi relations.
This type of asymmetry is not only felt in the official and formal engagements but also in civil society engagements. There is a persistent shadow of the British colonial psyche on the Indian establishment when they deal with neighbouring countries. The intelligentsia of Kathmandu wonders that none in the Indian establishment bothers to think that muscular diplomacy can do nothing in the long run to serve their nation. No wonder India has no real friends in the neighbourhood due to its muscular diplomacy. By lighting a fire in the neighbour’s house, one cannot be saved. During any crisis, India would find very skimpy voices of sympathy and support from its neighbours. India has no political or economic constituencies in the neighbourhood because India has never thought of cultivating such constituencies to serve its own foreign policy harvesting.
India’s policy, so far, has lacked a clearly defined perspective in dealing with political formations in Nepal. After the April 2006 historic and popular uprising, Nepal marked a substantive transformation in the relation between the Nepali state and the citizens. Without bloodshed and in a peaceful manner, the two-and-a-half-century-long monarchy was abolished last year. India tried to stop such a formation in April 21, 2006 when Karan Singh came with the proposal and the king of Nepal made a proclamation. However, the Nepali people rejected the Indian proposal and compelled the king to kneel down on April 24, 2006. Such types of political formation should be properly understood by the Indian establishment. They do not seem to be acquainted with the rising level of consciousness, aspirations and expectations among the masses of Nepal regarding diplomatic engagements with India. The Indian civil society and media should be sentient that “the clear by half” foreign policy establishment cannot serve Indian interests.
(The author is executive director of the Nepal South Asia Centre.)

















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